Political Context and the Consequences of Naming and Shaming for Human Rights Abuse

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Abstract

Does being named and shamed for human rights abuse influence the amount of foreign aid received by the shamed state? Recent research suggests that the impact of public censure may depend on the political relationship between donor and recipient. We argue that donors deriving a direct political benefit from the aid relationship (such as a military advantage or the satisfaction of a domestic political audience) will ignore or work against condemnation, but donors with little political interest in the recipient (who give aid for symbolic or humanitarian reasons) will punish condemned states. We also argue that the size of prior aid packages can be used as a holistic measure of the donor's political interest in the aid relationship, because mutually beneficial aid packages are subject to a bargaining process that favors recipients with more to offer. We find that condemnation for human rights abuse by the United Nations is associated with *lower* bilateral aid levels among states that previously received small aid package, and with *equal or higher* bilateral aid to states already receiving a great deal of aid. The source of shaming also matters: we find that public shaming by human rights NGOs is not associated with decreased aggregate bilateral aid.

Introduction

Does being named and shamed for human rights abuse have tangible consequences for the shamed country, or is the gesture merely symbolic? Recent research suggests that public censure has economic costs: international organizations and other multilateral providers cut foreign aid to countries condemned by the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009).[1] Yet aid also comes directly from other states, and the responses of these donor states to human rights abuse by aid recipients is mixed: for example, non-allied donors cut aid while allied donors maintain or even increase provided aid (Nielsen, 2013). What explains these different responses? Will some foreign aid providers impose punishment when a spotlight is shone on abuse, while others *increase* financial support? If so, does punishment by some states outweigh support from others, or do the effects offset one another in aggregate aid receipts? And does naming and shaming by organizations composed of and controlled by governments (such as the United Nations) have a different effect than condemnation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Dietrich and Murdie, 2016; Murdie and Davis, 2012)?

We argue that, when an aid recipient is denounced for human rights abuse, a donor state assesses this behavior in light of the political importance of the donor/recipient relationship. Many foreign aid relationships are predicated on the exchange of aid in return for some benefit to the donor; politically relevant benefits can include military cooperation, overflight or transit rights across a state's territory, preferential access to markets or strategically important resources, arms purchases from the donor country by the aid recipient, the promotion of a donor-friendly ideology in the recipient state, or the satisfaction of a domestic political audience with close ties to the recipient state. Aid relationships that do not provide these or other benefits are maintained for charitable reasons or to promote a positive image of the donor state, both of which are negated when the recipients are caught abusing human rights. But if the aid relationship provides tangible benefits to the donor, these benefits will weigh

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[1]The Commission on Human Rights was disbanded, and replaced by the Human Rights Council, in 2006.

against the reputational cost of cooperating with a known offender. The larger the donor's political benefit from the aid relationship, the less that naming and shaming matters in the decision to provide aid. In some situations, a donor might even increase aid to a shamed state in order to compensate it for aid lost from other sources and maintain the politically beneficial relationship. These other sources include multilateral organizations, which are usually focused on humanitarian ends and thus have few incentives to maintain aid in the face of condemnation (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009).

We submit that the level of aid the donor chose to provide in the past is a holistic measure of the donor's political interest in the aid relationship. There are innumerable reasons why a donor might choose to provide foreign aid, some of which have been directly measured in previous work (Nielsen, 2013; Dietrich and Murdie, 2016) and many of which are highly variable and context-specific. Because aid relationships must be mutually beneficial in order to be sustainable, we expect the recipients who can provide the largest political benefit to donors to be able to extract the largest aid packages through a bargaining process. Thus we assume that, holding the other characteristics of the relationship constant, greater aid implies greater donor benefit. If our argument is correct, then foreign aid relationships constitute a *state dependent dynamic system* (Esarey and DeMeritt, 2014): as prior aid to a recipient gets larger, the relationship between naming and shaming and foreign aid will shrink and may (eventually) change sign. This lagged aid measure allows us to capture aspects of donor political benefit that more targeted measures, such as whether the donor and recipient are allied, might miss.

In this paper, we describe the practice of naming and shaming in greater detail and explain why we believe that its effect will be contingent on how much the donor benefits (economically, strategically, or otherwise) from the aid provided. We distinguish between naming and shaming by the community of international states (e.g., by international bodies such as the United Nations) and by NGOs (e.g., by human rights organizations like Amnesty International). Then, we present and interpret a state-dependent empirical model of the

relationship between human rights abuse and bilateral foreign aid in two data sets: a dyadic panel of donor-recipient pairs between 1982 and 2004, and a monadic panel of aid recipients between 1979 and 2002.

Our primary analysis studies the effect of naming and shaming on bilateral economic aid provision in donor-recipient dyads, conditional on the aid the donor provided to the recipient in the previous year. Among states to whom a donor gave smaller aid packages in the past, the donor gives even less to states condemned by the UNCHR; among states with historically larger aid packages, there is no difference between condemned and non-condemned states. This relationship persists when controlling for other measures of the recipient's political importance to the donor (including donor-recipient alliances). Interestingly, this relationship does not exist between bilateral aid provision and shaming actions by NGOs (as measured by Murdie and Davis, 2012); indeed, we find a *positive* (but statistically uncertain) relationship between NGO shaming and dyadic bilateral aid.

To study the macro-level implications of micro-level behavior, we examine the aggregate bilateral aid receipts of condemned and uncondemned states. We find that UN resolutions condemning human rights abuse by an aid recipient are associated with lower levels of aggregate bilateral aid to that recipient when its aggregate aid receipts are already low, but with stable or increased aid receipts when they are already high. This evidence is consistent with the conclusion that the total effect of naming and shaming on foreign aid is to punish politically marginal states, but to retrench politically important patron-client relationships while leaving the human rights abuser largely unpunished. Naming and shaming by NGOs does not appear to have this relationship with aggregate bilateral aid.

We believe that our findings are consistent with a contextual story about how foreign aid donors respond to the condemnation of human rights abusers by the international community. Specifically, donors cut aid to condemned recipients in whom they have little direct political interest, but support and reinforce those from whom they derive substantial political benefit. The macro-level consequence is to insulate politically important human rights abusers from

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punishment, while subjecting less-important states to declining bilateral aid revenue. At the same time, human rights abusers condemned by NGOs appear to suffer no loss of aggregate bilateral aid, although other recent work suggests that some bilateral aid may be redirected through non-state channels (Dietrich and Murdie, 2016) and other sources of revenue (like private foreign direct investment) may be lost (Barry, Clay and Flynn, 2013). We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this interpretation for future research, for the structuring of human rights punishments, and for the role of morality in the international system.

Human rights, negative publicity, and state behavior

Why do the news media, the UN, and advocacy groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International exert effort to publicize the human rights abuses of governments around the world? Although naming and shaming has no direct cost to the targeted state, there are many reasons why it might nonetheless instigate tangible consequences for the violator (Dietrich and Murdie, 2016; Barry, Clay and Flynn, 2013; Murdie and Davis, 2012; DeMeritt, 2012; Franklin, 2008; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Ron, Ramos and Rogers, 2005). In this paper, we consider one particular consequence proposed by Lebovic and Voeten (2009): when human rights abuses become public, a donor government's reputation with its domestic public and the international community is damaged by continuing to support the offender.

State interests and their interaction with naming and shaming

Lebovic and Voeten (2009) argue that naming and shaming makes abuse public and might provide a defensible reason to restrict bilateral foreign aid. But if self-interest has a powerful effect on how a donor allocates its foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007; Heinrich, 2013; Lebovic, 1988, 2005; Meernik, Kreuger and Poe, 1998; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998), perhaps the effectiveness of

naming and shaming should be considered in the context of the donor's interests. It is easy to find a number of cases where donors give foreign aid to recipients that abuse human rights in exchange for apparent political benefits, even as these abusers are condemned by international organizations. In one well-known example, the United States provides a great deal of foreign aid to Egypt and Israel despite the fact that both countries have faced repeated international condemnation for human rights abuses (Rogin, 2014; Sharp, 2014). The U.S. derives strategic, military, and economic benefits from these relationships, notwithstanding the negative publicity they sometimes generate, and thus aid continues to flow despite naming and shaming of these states.

There are many other instances of mutually beneficial aid arrangements that ignore recipients' human rights violations. As one example, the U.S. provided aid to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to secure staging areas and transit points near Afghanistan as a part of ongoing military operations; these deals happened despite the aid recipients' questionable human rights records (Hodge, 2012; Nichol, 2013). In another example, the Chinese government has invested massive amounts of development spending and foreign aid in various parts of Africa (regardless of the extensive and ongoing human rights violations perpetrated by some governments who benefit from the assistance) in exchange for "access to Africa's natural resources and local markets, business opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for Chinese laborers" (Sun, 2014). It is hard to imagine intensified naming and shaming of human rights abuses seriously threatening any of these aid relationships absent some other change to the geopolitical situation; without such a change, the political benefit that the donor receives from the relationship simply outweighs the reputational cost.

By contrast, when a recipient that is politically less important to a donor is condemned for human rights abuses, the donor can provide less bilateral aid to that recipient without sacrificing its own political interests. Indeed, the altruistic and public relations benefits the donor enjoyed are presumably offset by the public shame associated with aiding a condemned government. For example, foreign aid to Rwanda has been curtailed in recent years (The

Economist 2013) and Western dissatisfaction with leader Paul Kagame's human rights record is a key reason why:

> Post-genocide Rwanda represents one particularly high-profile and difficult dilemma for Western donors. ...Its critics point to the country's poor performance in international measures of human rights compliance and political freedoms, and the regime stands accused by the UN of promoting war in eastern Congo. ...The dilemma has keenly tested the judgment of Rwanda's second largest donor, the UK. In the course of last year, DFID [the UK's Department for International Development] suspended, reinstated, and then suspended again budgetary support for Rwanda. Its equivocation tells of the complex choice that donors face in whether to aid or not to aid regimes whose ethical records raise concerns at the international level. ...Continued support of a regime that is unresponsive to and repressive of its citizens undermines the coherence of a development programme whose explicit objective is to improve the welfare and alleviate the suffering of the poor. (McDoom, 2013)

But the United Kingdom's response to Rwanda's human rights problems in no way implies that naming and shaming will always reduce bilateral foreign aid provision; based on our earlier examples, we might expect the UK to react very differently if it stood to derive non-humanitarian benefits from an aid relationship with Rwanda.

Heterogeneous sources of naming and shaming

The *source* of the "naming and shaming" might also be relevant to a state's response for a variety of reasons. In particular, it is plausible that a condemnation that comes from an international body composed of states (like the erstwhile United Nations Commission on Human Rights) will have very different consequences than one that comes from a non-governmental organization (like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch). It is unclear *a priori*

which kind of organization we would expect to be more effective at curtailing foreign aid via naming and shaming, though the extant literature provides some guidance.

There are reasons to believe that states would react more strongly to a condemnation issued by the UNCHR compared to one from an NGO. Presumably, any action of an organization like the UNCHR is the product of an explicitly political process wherein state actors pursue goals in competition and cooperation with other states. When such an organization issues a resolution, it signals that a group of states (e.g., at least a majority of the UNCHR members) has agreed to it. Even states that aren't formal members may have had a chance to express their views and influence the outcome through diplomatic means, perhaps blocking the issuance of resolutions that lack broad support. For all these reasons, states may be more willing to adjust their foreign aid policies when a resolution is issued. The very fact that a resolution is issued indicates that a critical mass of governments agrees with the resolution and might signal something about their willingness to support related policy changes. Such actions may also (as in most political decisions) be the focus of an opposition willing to react *against* that process by adjusting their foreign aid policies accordingly. The political nature of the UNCHR's process for handling human rights abuses is studied by Lebovic and Voeten (2006), who find empirical evidence that both political considerations *and* the severity of human rights abuses determine who is named and shamed by the UNCHR. Contrast a UNCHR action with a public statement by an organization like Human Rights Watch, which simply publicizes a situation as understood by that group; such a statement signals far less about the intentions or attitudes of the states which ultimately make foreign aid decisions.

On the other hand, external actors like NGOs may be able to place greater public pressure on states to change their aid policies through publicity campaigns meant to shame human rights violators. An organization like the UNCHR, composed of states with many competing interests, may elect to name and shame only in politically acceptable cases, leading to few condemnations of states whose aid packages could be realistically affected by the act (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006). Additionally, the UN might be unable or unwilling to actively

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generate negative publicity in its member states that violate human rights, meaning that its condemnations become ineffective—*if* negative publicity is truly how naming and shaming works (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Some prior work has shown that naming and shaming by NGOs might cause aid to be redirected away from recipient governments and toward non-state actors, although only by minor power donors for whom (presumably) strategic interests are less paramount (Dietrich and Murdie, 2016). There is also evidence that multinational corporations choose to reduce foreign direct investment in states shamed for human rights abuses by NGOs (Barry, Clay and Flynn, 2013).

We determine how differences in the source of naming and shaming impact bilateral foreign aid provision by comparing two different types of shaming:

1. public resolutions condemning human rights abuse by a target state issued by the UNCHR (collected by Lebovic and Voeten, 2006, 2009), and

2. the Murdie and Davis (2012) count of public shaming events by human rights NGOs.

The UNCHR resolution variable captures naming and shaming by recording the adoption of a public resolution by the UNCHR condemning the recepient state for human rights abuse in the prior year (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006, 2009). Although the UNCHR had other ways to react to human rights abuses, including an advisory procedure or considering allegations in closed session (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006, p. 864), public condemnation was the most severe sanction available. We use a binary measure indicating whether a resolution is issued in the prior year (= 1, and = 0 if not). We use this binary measure because (a) issuing a public condemnation via resolution coincides most closely with our understanding of "naming and shaming," and (b) this measure corresponds to the measure used by Lebovic and Voeten (2009) and allows us to directly compare our results to theirs.

The Murdie and Davis (2012) data comes from the Integrated Data for Event Analysis project. The measure counts the number of Reuters Global News Service reports of a conflictual nature (viz., naming and shaming events) concerning human rights organizations

for the country in question in the prior year. The count nature of the variable allows us to examine whether combined action by multiple NGOs and/or repetitive action by a single NGO has a cumulative impact on foreign aid decisions, as we might expect from existing models of how transnational advocacy works to produce change (e.g., Keck and Sikkink, 1998). We also examine a binary verion of this measure, where the binary indicator $= 1$ if there were any shaming events for the country in the prior year (and $= 0$ otherwise), to determine whether it is merely the presence or absence of NGO attention that prompts the policy change.

Figure 1 plots the relationship between UNCHR condemnations and NGO human rights shaming events for 119 aid recipients between 1993 and 2002; each point is a country-year. This plot depicts 95 UNCHR shaming events (8.1% of the 1171 observations) and 103 NGO shaming events (8.8% of the observations). Interestingly, although there *is* a statistically significant relationship between UNCHR resolutions and the count of NGO naming and shaming events (using a two-tailed test, $\alpha = 0.05$), the figure shows that this relationship is noisy and substantively weak. Indeed, only 15.5% of the observations shamed by an NGO are condemned by the UNCHR, and only 16.84% of observations condemned by the UNCHR are shamed by an NGO. It would therefore be unsurprising to find that the two forms of naming and shaming have very different relationships with the provision of foreign aid that reflect the very different processes that generate each form of condemnation.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Prior work has explored the idea that NGOs use information strategically as a mechanism of inducing states to change their behavior (e.g., Hendrix and Wong, 2013; Ron, Ramos and Rogers, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998); we might therefore expect systematic differences in some contextual variables between states that are shamed and those that are not at equivalent levels of human rights abuse. This presents the possibility of confounded results if a contextual variable explains both why a state is shamed and why it has lower (or higher) foreign aid receipts. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the state-years covered by

the UNCHR shaming variable, including for contextual variables that may be important for determining foreign aid decisions and/or which states to name and shame, from the Lebovic and Voeten (2009) data set.[2] The tables present summary statistics broken down by whether naming and shaming occurred in that state-year, and also whether the Gibney and Dalton (1996) personal integrity abuse measure is low or high (above or below 2.5 on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the lowest level of abuse) for the state-year in question. Consistent with the argument of Hendrix and Wong (2013), we find that the types of states selected for shaming differ systematically from those not selected in several ways; for example, civil liberties appear to be somewhat less protected in shamed states compared to non-shamed states at both high and low levels of physical integrity abuse. These differences explain why we must condition on these and other observable factors in our statistical models to ensure valid inference.

[Table 1 about here.]

The relationship between donor benefit, foreign aid, and naming and shaming

There are many possible reasons why an aid relationship might be important to the donor as well as the recipient. For example, both the European Union and Russia recently offered aid packages to Ukraine in the hopes of securing its cooperation on economic issues (Der Speigel 2013); Ukraine is strategically located between these two rivals, and Ukraine's eventual decision to side with the EU prompted Russia's seizure of Crimea (Curran, 2014). The United States has often provided aid in exchange for overflight or transit rights across a state's territory when that state is near a theater of interest; this happened during the Vietnam War, when the US needed to use Cambodian territory as a staging ground for offensives against North Vietnam (Yoon, 1997; Warner, 2011), and later during the Iraq and

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[2]Appendix Table 7 presents a similar analysis for the NGO shaming variable from the Murdie and Davis (2012) data set.

Afghanistan wars (with aid being provided to Central Asian post-Soviet states, as noted above). China provides foreign aid and investment in exchange for preferential access to markets or strategically important resources (e.g. in Africa, as noted above). Arab donors (like Saudi Arabia) provide a great deal of financial support to nearby countries with large Islamic populations, the apparent aim being the promotion of friendly policy and Islamic values in the recipient state (Villanger, 2007). A recent (and controversial) book argues that the United States' aid relationship with Israel is largely aimed at satisfying a large and politically mobilized domestic constituency that favors close ties with the Israeli government and people (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008). Finally, and perhaps most obviously, donors create humanitarian benefits and enjoy reputational gains by providing aid to needy countries.

Some of these motivations for donor interest in the aid relationship have been directly measured in past research. For example, Nielsen (2013) examines the existence of a military alliance and the similarity of UN voting patterns in order to identify shared military and political interests. Dietrich and Murdie (2016, p. 7) distinguish between major powers, whose officials "are more constrained by 'realpolitik' concerns and are thus not likely to systematically respond to [NGO] shaming campaigns," and minor powers who may be influenced by these campaigns. We think that the reasons for donor political benefit are sufficiently heterogenous (and sometimes ephemeral) that a more holistic measure would be useful to capture how much donor political benefit changes the link between naming and shaming and foreign aid. In this spirit, we think that the size of previous aid packages serves as a useful summary measure of the donor's political interest in the relationship.

Our reasoning for using lagged aid as a holistic measure of donor political benefit is based on a simple idea: aid packages that provide mutual benefit are subject to bargaining and negotation between donor and recipient, and as a result we expect the final allocation of aid to be directly proportional to donor benefit. This expectation is implied, for example, if the size of an aid package is determined by a two player infinite horizon alternating offer Rubinstein bargaining game (Rubinstein, 1982). The bargaining space in this situation (viz.,

the value of the "pie" to be shared) is equal to the total benefit the donor derives from the aid relationship (in dollars). The recipient's share of the benefit is analogous to the price the donor pays in order to receive a benefit in exchange; a rational donor might give very little in exchange for many benefits and thereby get a good deal, but it would never grant aid worth more than the benefits it stood to receive in exchange. It is well known that, if both players are equally and infinitely patient in this game, the equilibrium outcome is for both players to receive an equal share of the total benefit; players can receive unequal shares if they value present returns more highly than future returns, or if one player enjoys an advantaged position in the bargaining process (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Chapter 7). But the equilibrium outcome of the game is a *share* of the total benefit, and consequently the size of the aid package—that is, the aid recipient's share of the pie in the bargaining game times the pie's value—will be proportional to the size of the donor's total benefit (the value of the pie) when holding all other factors constant. By this logic, we argue that the size of a foreign aid package serves as a reasonable measure of the political benefit derived from the aid relationship by the donor; the humanitarian and reputational benefits of an aid relationship presumably vary to some degree from case to case, but we argue that the political benefits of a relationship are on average much larger and more variable.

There is evidence that states that have received a great deal of foreign aid from one or more sources are protected from the consequences of condemnation for human rights abuses by the UNCHR. Figure 2a depicts bilateral aid data used in the analysis of Lebovic and Voeten (2009). The figure shows the distribution of total (logged) bilateral aid per capita for recipient states that have and have not been condemned by the UNCHR for human rights abuses in the prior year; the top panel lists the states receiving less than the median amount of aid in the previous year, while the bottom panel lists states receiving more than the median amount of aid. Among recipients with historically smaller packages, condemned recipients receive considerably less aid than non-condemned recipients. A two-variable tobit regression confirms that condemned aid recipients receive $\approx 57\%$ less aid, on average, compared to non-

condemned recipients ($p < 0.001$, two-tailed). But among recipients with historically larger aid packages, there is no visually appreciable difference between the two; a tobit regression indicates that condemned recipients receive $\approx 15\%$ *more* aid, though the difference is on the margin of statistical significance ($p = 0.076$, two-tailed).

[Figure 2 about here.]

It appears that being shamed by an NGO is also associated with lower provision of bilateral aid, and superficially the effect seems to be related to the size of prior aid packages. This is shown in Figure 2b, which repeats the analysis of Figure 2a but substitutes a measure of whether the state experienced any human rights organization public shaming events (as defined by Murdie and Davis, 2012) in the prior year. States that experienced at least one shaming event received $\approx 33\%$ less aid, on average, than those that did not ($p = 0.006$, two-tailed) if their prior year's aid package was below 3.25. Among those with larger aid packages, states that experienced at least one shaming received $\approx 29\%$ less aid ($p = 0.020$, two-tailed). However, the difference between low and high prior aid states is not statistically significant ($p = 0.840$, two-tailed).

Does naming and shaming impact foreign aid? Evidence from bilateral aid receipts

When the effect of an independent variable x on the dependent variable y depends on previous levels of y, we call the data generating process *state dependent*. As demonstrated in Esarey and DeMeritt (2014), such a DGP can be accurately modeled by including an interaction term between x and a lag of y:

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_{(t-1)} + \beta_2 x + \beta_3 y_{(t-1)} x + \beta_4 z + \varepsilon_t$$

when a linear model is appropriate. Here, that interaction allows us to test our expectation that the impact of naming and shaming on foreign aid depends on the political relationship between donor and recipient, as measured by past aid provision. Esarey and DeMeritt (2014) shows that a t-test for β_3 provides a valid test for this proposition; a BIC comparison between models with and without the interaction term provides another.

To determine whether naming and shaming has a state-dependent relationship with bilateral foreign aid, we use the data set analyzed in Nielsen (2013). The dyadic Nielsen data set measures logged economic aid per capita[3] flows from 21 OECD countries (donor states) to 113 developing countries (recipient states) between 1982 and 2004.[4] The unit of analysis is the donor-recipient dyad. Nielsen's original model provides evidence that a donor state treats strategically allied recipient states differently when those recipients abuse their citizens' fundamental human rights. Our replication of Nielsen's original analysis is depicted in Column 1 of Table 2, and is comparable to his original findings.[5]

The random-effects tobit model of Column 1 interacts CIRI's 9-point index of Physical Integrity Violations (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010) with a series of independent variables designed to measure the strategic value of the recipient state to the donor:

- Alliance: a binary indicator of whether the recipient and donor state are formally militarily allied in the prior year (Leeds et al., 2002)

- Allied neighbor: a binary indicator of whether the recipient borders a military ally of the donor in the prior year

- Similarity of voting records in the United Nations in the prior year, $\in [-1, 1]$, where more positive numbers indicate more similar interests (Gartzke, 2006)

In each case, Nielsen hypothesizes that the negative effect of an aid recipient's human rights

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[3]Specifically, ln(aid per 1000 people +1) in constant US dollars.

[4]The spatio-temporal coverage of our models varies due to variable availability; see Tables 2 and 3.

[5]There are minor, but substantively unimportant numerical differences in the results apparently owing to our use of Stata 14.1 rather than Stata 9. We are able to precisely replicate Nielsen's results when using Stata 9.

violations on its aid receipts will be blunted, and perhaps even reversed, when that recipient is an ally of, borders an ally of, or has a UN voting record similar to the donor state. The model also includes other variables designed to test other hypotheses and control variables.[6] To this framework, we add our two measures of naming and shaming to determine whether it has an impact on bilateral economic aid flows: the binary UNCHR resolution variable from Lebovic and Voeten (2009) and the count of NGO naming and shaming actions compiled by Murdie and Davis (2012).

Analysis using UNCHR condemnation

We begin with an analysis using the UNCHR resolution variable; the results are shown in Table 2. Model 1 replicates the results of Nielsen (2013). Model 2 substitutes the UNCHR condemnation variable[7] for Physical Integrity violations in each of the interactions with Nielsen's measures of strategic importance and removes ancillary interaction terms that are not relevant to our analysis; the overall fit of the model is improved over model 1 according to the BIC. However, both of these models are improved upon by a model that allows for state dependence by interacting the UN condemnation variable with the lagged dependent

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[6]These variables are: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year (compiled by Nielsen (2013) using information from the UNHCR online database (UNHCR, 2009)), logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six selected UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor as of the previous year, donor Physical Integrity Rights score in the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010), ln aggregate global aid flows, ln GDP per capita in the prior year (Gleditsch, 2002), ln Population in the prior year (Gleditsch, 2002), ln Trade in the prior year (Gleditsch, 2002), whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor (Norris, 2009), whether the recipient is a socialist state (Sachs and Warner, 1999), a dummy for whether the year takes place during the Cold War period (pre-1992), Cold War * Socialist, Cold War * recipient Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year (Gleditsch et al., 2002), a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and region dummy variables. If not otherwise noted, these variables are collected by Nielsen (2013); our source for all these variables is the replication data set for Nielsen's publication. Logged variables are coded in the source data set so that their minimum value is zero (for example, 1 is added to the number of New York Times articles that mention human rights). Model 1 also contains a number of interaction terms relevant to Nielsen's analysis but not relevant to ours: ln refugees$_{i(t-1)}$ * recipient Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$, ln NYT articles$_{i(t-1)}$ * Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$, ratification$_{i(t-1)}$ * Physical Integrity Rights$_{i(t-1)}$, and Cold War$_{it}$ * recipient Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$. Models in Table 3 drop the Cold War control variable and any interactions with this variable; the Murdie and Davis (2012) NGO count variable spans the years 1992-2004 and the Cold War was concluded by 1992.

[7]25 unique recipient states are condemned in the spatio-temporal window of data covered by Models 2-4 in Table 2, and 24 are condemned in the window of data for Model 1.

variable; model 4 has only this interaction, while model 3 also interacts UNCHR resolution with each of Nielsen's measures of strategic importance. The BIC favors model 4, while the AIC favors model 3. Interestingly, some of the coefficients and uncertainty estimates on Nielsen's (2012) measures of strategic importance do not change much when the interaction between UNCHR resolution and the lagged DV is added (compare models 2 and 3), and the AIC prefers including interaction terms between these measures and UNCHR resolution alongside our lagged DV interaction. Moreover, when comparing the out of sample prediction accuracy of equivalent models with a lag interaction (Model 3) and without one (Model 2), the model with the lag interaction term performs better.[8] We think this reinforces the notion that a lagged aid measure captures additional aspects of donor political interest in the aid relationship that are not captured by more direct aid measures (such as Nielsen's indicators) without displacing these direct measures.[9]

[Table 2 about here.]

Substantively, both models 3 and 4 tell us that a UNCHR resolution is associated with lower economic aid receipts for condemned recipients—but only when those recipients are already receiving comparatively small aid packages. This is most easily seen in a marginal effects plot of the relationship between UNCHR resolutions and logged per capita economic

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[8]To test the out of sample prediction capabilities of these models, we fit each model on all data up to and including the year 1998, then produced out of sample forecasts for the years 1999 and 2000. (We excluded post-2001 observations and any associated dummy variables from the models because the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001 may have caused a substantial change in the environment that would not be well predicted by prior years.) We then calculated the squared prediction error in 1999 and 2000 for both models. Our calculated prediction error subtracts each dyad's mean error value to correct for the fact that Stata's xttobit predictions margin out the random effects; subtracting the dyad's mean error restores a differential intercept. We then subtracted the squared prediction error for each observation for the two models. On average, Model 3's squared prediction error is -0.0025756 smaller than Model 2's, with a 90% confidence interval for the difference of $[-0.0062817, 0.0011306]$ and a 50% confidence interval of $[-0.0040951, -0.001056]$. In appendix Figure 8, we compare the observed trajectories of three donor-recipient dyads to their model predicted trajectories; these dyads have some of the largest out of sample prediction differences in our sample (at or above the 98.5th percentile of difference).

[9]The appendix offers several alternative specifications of Model 3 that do not change our substantive conclusions. Appendix Table 6 shows the result of adding the initial value of the lagged dependent variable as an approach to modeling the initial conditions in each state; this modeling approach is suggested by Wooldridge (2005). Appendix Table 8 considers using two lags of the dependent variable and their interactions with the prior year UNCHR Resolution (instead of a one year lag and its interaction) to capture the history of aid.

aid at different prior levels of aid, which we have constructed in Figure 3 (using Model 3). When prior levels of logged per capita economic aid are $\lesssim 7$ (or about \$1096 per 1000 people), naming and shaming for human rights violations tends to be associated with lower foreign aid receipts in the year after condemnation. However, for those with larger aid packages in the prior year, UN condemnation is associated with *larger* aid packages. A country that received $\approx \$10000$ per 1000 people in foreign aid tends to receive $\approx 50\%$ more aid during a condemnation period.

When a recipient state has gotten little aid from a donor in the past, and that recipient is shamed for abuse, it appears (in this data set) that the donor responds by decreasing the amount of aid it sends. We think this is because relationships that are of low political importance to the donor derive their value from humanitarian or symbolic considerations, both of which are undermined when the abuse of a recipient government is made public. In these cases, the donor attempts to punish the recipient in the face of public condemnation. But when a receiving state has gotten more aid in the past, and that state is shamed for human rights abuse, the donor state responds by maintaining or increasing aid. We think this is because the aid relationship is politically important to the donor, and the donor state attempts to buttress its partner in the face of public condemnation.[10]

[Figure 3 about here.]

Similar dynamics hold when we examine the long term trajectories of economic aid provided by donors to recipients condemned by the UNCHR. Figure 4 shows aid trajectories simulated out of the model from Column 3 of Table 2 for one recipient receiving a large

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[10]At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we also investigated whether donors who engaged in human rights abuses and/or were named and shamed were less reactive to naming and shaming of aid recipients. Appendix Table 9 adds an interaction between lagged donor physical integrity violations and UNCHR condemnation to Model 4 of Table 2 (with the results shown in Column 2), comparing this model to an equivalent model (in Column 1) without the interaction. Appendix Table 10 repeats the analysis of Models 1 and 2 from Table 3, but only for dyads where the donor has been shamed by an NGO at least once in the given year. Appendix Table 11 adds an interaction with donor shaming by NGOs to Model 3 from Table 3. None of these models finds statistically significant evidence that donors' reaction to naming and shaming varies over these dimensions. This lack of relationship may be because the donor states are 21 OECD countries and typically have greater respect for human rights than the international average.

aid package and one receiving a smaller aid package, both of which are condemned by the UNCHR each year for ten years.[11] The dyadic analysis of long term trajectories matches our earlier analysis of aggregate bilateral aid: large aid recipients get increased aid after UN condemnation, while smaller recipients get less. In our example, a ten year UN condemnation results in a total $\approx 337\%$ increase for the large aid recipients, and a $\approx 77\%$ decrease for the smaller aid recipient.

[Figure 4 about here.]

Analysis using NGO naming and shaming

We get very different results when we study naming and shaming by non-governmental organizations. Our key independent variable is the yearly count of Reuters Global News Service reports of a conflictual nature (viz., naming and shaming events) concerning human rights organizations; this data is compiled from the Integrated Data for Event Analysis project by Murdie and Davis (2012, see p. 5). We also shift from using a random effects tobit model to a standard tobit model with standard errors clustered by dyad.[12] Table 3 shows the results.

[Table 3 about here.]

This analysis reveals no statistically significant relationship between NGO human rights shaming events and bilateral economic aid flows when we look at the count of shaming events

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[11]We recover the beta coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from Stata's xttobit output, then simulate 1000 draws from the normal distribution using this information. We then simulated the dependent variable (log economic aid per capita) out of each draw for multiple periods. We fixed each continuous independent variable at its mean and all binary variables (alliance, allied neighbor, etc.) at zero; this includes the UNCHR resolution variable. All interactions with the resolution variable are set accordingly. Once the dependent variable converges to an equilibrium level, we change the resolution variable to 1 for ten time periods; this includes interaction terms. Then, we revert the resolution variable to zero and wait until the dependent variable converges once more. The plot depicts the 10th, 50th, and 90th quantiles of the dependent variable at each time period. The low and high aid initial packages are manipulated by adding a fixed effect to the dependent variable (8.8 for the high package and 6 for the low package).

[12]This change in model is necessary because a random effects tobit model failed to converge in this data set. The failure of the RE Tobit model to converge may be because the Murdie and Davis (2012) count of naming and shaming events is not available as far back in time as the UNCHR resolution variable (the years 1992-2004 are available, meaning that lagged values are only available from 1993-2004).

(as in models 1 and 2 of Table 3). When we examine a dichotomous indicator of whether any shaming events occured (as in models 3 and 4), we actually find a *positive* relationship between NGO shaming and bilateral aid that is statistically significant using a two-tailed test with $\alpha = 0.05$, but not with $\alpha < 0.01$. The amount of aid received in the prior year does not appear to moderate this relationship; a marginal effect plot based on Model 4 (using the dichotomous indicator of NGO shaming), depicted in Appendix Figure 7, illustrates the point.

Evidence from aggregate aid receipts: A re-examination of Lebovic and Voeten (2009)

Our dyadic analysis indicates that individual donors send less aid to politically unimportant recipients condemned by the UNCHR for human rights violations, and as much or more aid to condemned states that are politically important to the donor. But how does this micro-level reaction to naming and shaming impact the aggregate aid receipts of condemned states? Is the support of friendly states enough to offset the shunning of others? To answer this question, we re-examine the monadic panel data set compiled by Lebovic and Voeten (2009) to determine whether a UNCHR resolution or the count of NGO human rights public shaming events impacts a condemned state's aggregate bilateral aid receipts, conditional on its past levels of aid.

Results for UNCHR condemnation

Table 4 presents our results for the relationship between UNCHR resolutions and aggregate bilateral aid receipts. The first column replicates the results from column 1 of Table 2 in Lebovic and Voeten (2009, p. 90); our replication closely matches the original printed

results.[13] The second column adds an interaction term between lagged bilateral aid and prior year UNCHR resolutions, allowing us to look for state dependence as described above and in Nielsen (2013). The dependent variable in all models is the natural log per capita of bilateral aid commitments (in 2004 US dollars) from OECD countries to all 118 countries identified by the OECD as "developing countries" between 1979 and 2002; 1 is added to all values to set the minimum value of the DV to zero.[14] As in our extension of Nielsen (2013) above, the key independent variable captures naming and shaming by recording the adoption of a public resolution by the UNCHR condemning the recipient state for human rights abuse.[15] The models also include a set of controls typically assumed to be related both to UNCHR condemnation and to bilateral foreign aid, including:

- Agreement with the U.S.: An index ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values capture increasing levels of vote correspondence with the United States in the UN General Assembly (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009).

- Level of personal integrity abuse: An ordinal variable ranging from 1 through 5, where higher values capture increasingly widespread and severe political terror (Gibney and Dalton, 1996).

- Change in personal integrity abuse: The difference between personal integrity abuse at t and $t - 1$, using the ordinal scale described above.

- Level of civil liberties: An ordinal variable ranging from 1 through 7, where higher values indicate increasing restrictions on political freedom.[16]

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[13]Lebovic and Voeten test the effects of CHR resolutions on bilateral, multilateral, and World Bank aid. We replicated all three models and found no evidence of state dependence with respect to multilateral or World Bank aid. For these reasons, and because we seek to investigate the theoretical story told above, we focus here on the replication engaging bilateral aid.

[14]The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 6.64 (or $0 to $764 per capita).

[15]26 unique recipient states are condemned in the spatio-temporal window covered by the models in Table 4.

[16]This variable comes from Freedom House, and is available at http://www.freedomhouse.org.

- Change in civil liberties: The difference between civil liberties at t and $t-1$, using the ordinal scale described above.

- Economic development: The natural log of GDP per capita (in 2004 US dollars), drawn from *International Development Statistics*.

- Population: The natural log of total mid-year population, also drawn from *International Development Statistics*.

- Violent political conflict: A binary indicator of involvement in civil and/or international war (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

- Military capabilities: A composite indicator of military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population.[17]

Finally, linear and quadratic temporal trends control for "across-the-board fluctuations in levels of aid-giving" (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009, p. 88). The bottom row of Table 4 presents the AIC and BIC for each model.

[Table 4 about here.]

As the table shows, the interaction term between the lagged DV and UNCHR resolutions is statistically significant. In addition, the AIC and BIC for the dynamic interaction model are smaller than for the straight replication. All of these indications suggest that the relationship between UNCHR resolutions and aggregate bilateral aid is dependent on the past level of aid.

Instantaneous marginal effect of UNCHR resolutions on bilateral aid

What does these results mean in terms of substantive impact? Figure 5 presents the immediate impact of a UNCHR resolution on bilateral aid, and shows how the marginal effect

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[17]The indicator, provided by the Correlates of War project, is available online at http://www.correlatesofwar.org.

of such a resolution is associated with the level of previous aid. When the natural log of lagged bilateral aid is less than three (about $19 per capita), a CHR resolution shaming a state for human rights abuse is associated with a *decrease* in current aid. When the natural log of lagged aid is greater than three, the relationship inverts so that a CHR resolution is associated with an *increase* in bilateral aid.

[Figure 5 about here.]

Long term marginal effect of UNCHR resolutions on bilateral aid

Figure 5 shows the immediate effect of a UNCHR resolution on aid, but what about the effect over time? Figure 6 shows aid trajectories simulated out of the model from Column 2 of Table 4 for two different states—one receiving a large initial aid package and one receiving a small initial aid package—that were condemned for a ten year period.[18] As the figure shows, aid to the state with the initially high aid package increases rapidly, tapering off to an $\approx$ 72% increase in aid over ten years. But aid to the state with the initially low aid package decreases nearly as rapidly, eventually reaching a $\approx$ 42% cut from initial levels. After the condemnation is lifted, both trajectories revert gradually to the previous equilibrium.

[Figure 6 about here.]

Results for NGO naming and shaming

Table 5 presents our results for the relationship between naming and shaming for human rights abuses by NGOs and a state's aggregate bilateral aid receipts. As in our prior analysis of dyadic bilateral aid flows, we examine both (a) the count of NGO shaming events in the

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[18]We recover the beta coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the regression, then simulated 1000 draws from the normal distribution using this information. We then simulated the dependent variable (log bilateral aid per capita) out of each draw for multiple periods. We fix each continuous independent variable at its mean, except for change in the personal integrity and civil liberties scores, war, UN resolution, and the time variables (all set to zero). Once the dependent variable converges to an equilibrium level, we change the resolution variable to 1 for ten time periods. Then, we revert the resolution variable to zero and wait until the dependent variable converges once more. The plot depicts the 10th, 50th, and 90th quantiles of the dependent variable at each time period.

prior year and (b) a binary indicator of whether a state is subject to any shaming events in the prior year. In short, our analysis indicates no statistically significant relationship between either of these variables and a state's aggregate bilateral aid flows.

[Table 5 about here.]

Conclusions and implications

We believe that our results provide a starting point for a deeper understanding of how naming and shaming for human rights abuse influences bilateral foreign aid. If subsequent research confirms that the impact of naming and shaming on foreign aid receipts depends on the political relationship between donor and recipient, it has important substantive implications for how this strategy can be effectively used to protect human rights. For example, it suggests that naming and shaming by international bodies such as the United Nations can be an effective strategy for punishing human rights abusers who are dependent on aid from the international community at large, but not those with a small number of patrons with shared strategic interests. Offenders with these sorts of strong bilateral relationships may find those relationships *reinforced* by condemnation.

Indeed, our study fits into a body of recent work indicating that not all naming and shaming is created equal: donor states' response to naming and shaming can vary according to the identity of the recipient, the organization doing the shaming, and the larger context in which the shaming happens. For example, although we find no evidence that total bilateral aid receipts are associated with NGO shaming, a recent study by Dietrich and Murdie (2016) finds that donors may *redirect* the bilateral aid they provide to non-state actors and organizations (instead of the recipient's government) when the recipient is shamed by NGOs for human rights abuses. They also find that major powers are unlikely to redirect aid in response to NGO shaming, perhaps because the geopolitical and strategic interests of these states in cultivating a client-patron relationship outweighs any cost of cooperating with a

human rights abuser. Another study (Barry, Clay and Flynn, 2013) finds that NGO naming and shaming influences FDI decisions by private companies. Future work that builds a formal model of international aid imcorporating the state-dependence of foreign aid packages could be fruitful for understanding the net effect of condemnation in the international system at large, how such tactics reverberate through the network of inter-state relationships, and help us to refine the effectiveness of a punishment regime for human rights abuses.

More generally, our results and those of past work in this literature may help us understand how ethical constraints function in the international system. When the international community cooperates on joint efforts (like World Bank or other multilateral aid projects), the results of Lebovic and Voeten (2009) suggest that moral arguments can be efficaceous. The community of donors, in its capacity as a collective, shows unwillingness to provide human rights abusers with assistance. For individual states, however, state-dependence in this relationship (and prior evidence of conditionality found by Nielsen (2013) and Dietrich and Murdie (2016)) implies that ethical considerations are in tension with political considerations. These findings do not mean that states are not influenced by moral arguments. However, it appears that moral arguments can be ignored or actively resisted when they threaten a politically relevant relationship. All this is a way of saying that, even in the anarchy of the international system, there may be a moral code that pushes on individual state behavior—so much so that sometimes states push back still harder. Thus, while naming and shaming is an important tool for actors interested in limiting human rights abuse, our evidence suggests that it is most effective at punishing offenders via reduced foreign aid when done through international organizations composed of states and targeted at those offenders without strong strategic partners in the donor community.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics for State-Years, by UNCHR Shaming Resolution Status and Lagged Personal Integrity Abuse Score*

	low abuse no resolution mean/sd	low abuse resolution passed mean/sd	high abuse no resolution mean/sd	high abuse resolution passed mean/sd
ln (Bilateral aid PC + 1)	3.525	4.542	2.816	2.284
	(1.295)	(1.236)	(1.324)	(1.524)
lag ln (Bilateral aid PC + 1)	3.548	4.589	2.796	2.195
	(1.317)	(1.227)	(1.292)	(1.531)
lag Civil Liberties	4.420	4.550	4.998	5.849
	(1.619)	(2.038)	(1.398)	(1.260)
lag ln GDP per capita	7.045	7.370	6.600	6.649
	(1.234)	(1.317)	(1.105)	(1.102)
lag ln Population	14.484	14.175	16.374	16.375
	(1.605)	(1.709)	(1.577)	(1.280)
lag Agreement with USA	0.362	0.449	0.346	0.338
	(0.119)	(0.230)	(0.119)	(0.123)
lag War	0.052	0.300	0.405	0.677
	(0.222)	(0.470)	(0.491)	(0.469)
lag CINC Capabilities	0.006	0.009	0.034	0.020
	(0.027)	(0.010)	(0.096)	(0.020)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	-0.629	-0.350	-1.538	-2.396
	(7.430)	(8.054)	(6.637)	(5.841)
Observations	1297	20	1442	217

*Main figures are means; standard deviations in parentheses. Low abuse state-years have Gibney and Dalton (1996) Physical Integrity Abuse scores less than 2.5; high abuse state-years have scores greater than or equal to 2.5.

Table 2: State-dependence in Dyadic Bilateral Aid Flows*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$DV_{i(t-1)}$	0.442***	0.401***	0.385***	0.387***
	(47.35)	(39.12)	(36.93)	(37.12)
Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.204*	-0.0639***	-0.0644***	-0.0674***
	(-2.05)	(-3.95)	(-3.99)	(-4.18)
UNCHR Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$		-0.997***	-1.629***	-0.939***
		(-4.77)	(-7.17)	(-6.79)
$DV_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$			0.249***	0.235***
			(7.40)	(7.23)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$	0.0904	0.353	0.399	0.412*
	(0.39)	(1.71)	(1.93)	(2.01)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$ * Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	0.0986*			
	(2.18)			
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$		1.181	0.209	
		(1.92)	(0.33)	
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$	0.703**	-0.120	-0.0886	0.0359
	(2.98)	(-0.58)	(-0.43)	(0.18)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$ * Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0741*			
	(-2.00)			
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$		0.823**	0.826**	
		(3.10)	(3.11)	
UN Voting Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.920***	-0.159	-0.179	-0.0902
	(-3.85)	(-0.88)	(-1.00)	(-0.51)
UN Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$ * Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	0.158***			
	(3.33)			
UN Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$		1.158**	1.392**	
		(2.66)	(3.17)	
Observations	41935	35234	35234	35234
Dyads	2364	2088	2088	2088
Recipients	113	100	100	100
Donors	21	21	21	21
AIC	85042.8	85073.3	85027.8	85036.3

BIC		85337.3	85334.1	85297.0	85280.2

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*Main entries are random-effects Tobit regression coefficients, with the random effects drawn by dyad. Dependent variable = ln (Economic Aid/(1000 people) + 1), in constant dollars. The AIC/BIC reported is calculated on the subsample of 33310 observations (in 2086 dyads) that are common to all models (so as to enable a fair comparison). Variables in the model but not listed: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year, logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor state as of the prior year, donor Physical Integrity Rights score in the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year, ln aggregate global aid flows in the current year, ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Population$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Trade$_{i(t-1)}$, whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor, whether the recipient is a socialist state, a dummy for whether the year takes place during the Cold War period (pre-1992), Cold War * Socialist, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year, a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and regional fixed effects. Model 1 also includes several additional interaction terms to maintain consistency with Nielsen (2012): ln refugees$_{i(t-1)}$ * recipient Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$, ln NYT articles$_{i(t-1)}$ * Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$, ratification$_{i(t-1)}$ * Physical Integrity Rights$_{i(t-1)}$, and Cold War$_{it}$ * recipient Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$. Logged variables are coded in the source data set so that their minimum value is finite (for example, 1 is added to the number of New York Times articles that mention human rights). Model 1 covers observations between the years 1983-2004; Models 2-4 cover observations between the years 1982-2002. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Table 3: State-Dependence in Dyadic Bilateral Economic Aid Flows, Murdie and Davis (2012) NGO Shaming Measure*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{DV}_{i(t-1)}$	0.852***	0.852***	0.852***	0.853***
	(61.30)	(60.85)	(61.32)	(59.96)
Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0331	-0.0331	-0.0340	-0.0339
	(-1.86)	(-1.86)	(-1.90)	(-1.90)
NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$	0.0281	0.0299		
	(1.76)	(1.08)		
$\text{DV}_{i(t-1)}$ * NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$		-0.000572		
		(-0.09)		
NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)} \geq 1$			0.170*	0.195
			(2.47)	(1.64)
$\text{DV}_{i(t-1)}$ * NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)} \geq 1$				-0.00788
				(-0.29)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$	0.405***	0.405***	0.409***	0.409***
	(3.79)	(3.79)	(3.83)	(3.83)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$	0.289**	0.289**	0.290**	0.289**
	(2.68)	(2.67)	(2.68)	(2.67)
UN Voting Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0736	-0.0734	-0.0739	-0.0731
	(-0.59)	(-0.59)	(-0.59)	(-0.59)
Observations	25142	25142	25142	25142
Dyads	2308	2308	2308	2308
Recipients	110	110	110	110
Donors	21	21	21	21
AIC	67888.3	67890.2	67885.4	67887.3
BIC	68091.6	68101.7	68088.7	68098.8

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*Main entries are Tobit regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by dyad. Dependent variable = ln (Economic Aid/Capita + 1), in constant dollars. Variables in the model but not listed: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year, logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor state as of the prior year, donor Physical Integrity Rights score in the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year, ln aggregate global aid flows in the current year, ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Population$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Trade$_{i(t-1)}$, whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor, whether the recipient is a socialist state, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year, a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and regional fixed effects. Logged variables are coded in the source data set so that their minimum value is finite (for example, 1 is added to the number of New York Times articles that mention human rights). Models cover observations between the years 1993 and 2004. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Table 4: State-dependence in Aggregate Bilateral Aid Flows, UNCHR Resolution Shaming Measure*

	(1)	(2)
$DV_{i(t-1)}$	0.553***	0.539***
	(25.51)	(24.45)
UNCHR Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0299	-0.392***
	(-0.51)	(-3.36)
$DV_{i(t-1)}$ * UNCHR Res$_{i(t-1)}$		0.136***
		(3.60)
Δ Personal Integrity Abuse	-0.0370*	-0.0381*
	(-2.20)	(-2.27)
Personal Integrity Abuse$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0175	-0.0191
	(-0.96)	(-1.05)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.0155	-0.0150
	(-0.80)	(-0.78)
Civil Liberties$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0205	-0.0193
	(-1.60)	(-1.52)
ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.107***	-0.117***
	(-4.26)	(-4.69)
ln population$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.162***	-0.159***
	(-5.23)	(-5.21)
Agreement with USA$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.123	-0.145
	(-0.85)	(-1.00)
War$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0877*	-0.0974**
	(-2.54)	(-2.83)
Capabilities$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.759	-0.839
	(-1.25)	(-1.41)
Time (linear)	-0.00491***	-0.00492***
	(-4.41)	(-4.43)
Time (quadratic)	-0.0000462	-0.0000377
	(-0.54)	(-0.44)
Observations	2324	2324
Recipients	118	118

AIC	3613.4	3602.5
BIC	3705.4	3700.2

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Main entries are random effects MLE regression coefficients. Dependent variable = ln (Bilateral Aid/Capita + 1), in 2004 dollars. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Table 5: State-dependence in Aggregate Bilateral Aid Flows, Murdie et al. (2012) NGO Shaming Measure*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DV$_{i(t-1)}$	0.806***	0.805***	0.806***	0.806***
	(42.34)	(41.73)	(42.30)	(40.99)
NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0139	-0.0321		
	(-0.82)	(-0.82)		
DV$_{i(t-1)}$ * NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$		0.00723		
		(0.52)		
NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)} \geq 1$			0.0114	0.0277
			(0.20)	(0.22)
DV$_{i(t-1)}$ * NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)} \geq 1$				-0.00653
				(-0.15)
Δ Personal Integrity Abuse	0.0222	0.0216	0.0225	0.0227
	(0.88)	(0.86)	(0.89)	(0.90)
Personal Integrity Abuse$_{i(t-1)}$	0.0311	0.0306	0.0298	0.0299
	(1.35)	(1.33)	(1.29)	(1.29)
Δ Civil Liberties	-0.0502	-0.0504	-0.0498	-0.0498
	(-1.84)	(-1.85)	(-1.83)	(-1.83)
Civil Liberties$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0356**	-0.0354**	-0.0369**	-0.0368**
	(-2.64)	(-2.63)	(-2.73)	(-2.73)
ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0826***	-0.0826***	-0.0841***	-0.0839***
	(-4.79)	(-4.79)	(-4.87)	(-4.85)
ln population$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0615***	-0.0614***	-0.0620***	-0.0620***
	(-3.78)	(-3.78)	(-3.81)	(-3.81)
Agreement with USA$_{i(t-1)}$	0.145	0.139	0.153	0.155
	(0.67)	(0.64)	(0.71)	(0.72)
War$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0835	-0.0840	-0.0864	-0.0861
	(-1.76)	(-1.78)	(-1.83)	(-1.82)
Capabilities$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.315	-0.291	-0.346	-0.354
	(-1.22)	(-1.11)	(-1.34)	(-1.34)
Time (linear)	-0.0151	-0.0147	-0.0145	-0.0146

	(-0.74)	(-0.72)	(-0.71)	(-0.72)
Time (quadratic)	0.000580	0.000567	0.000537	0.000541
	(0.90)	(0.88)	(0.83)	(0.84)
Observations	989	989	989	989
Recipients	112	112	112	112
AIC	1529.4	1531.1	1530.0	1532.0
BIC	1607.8	1614.4	1608.4	1615.3

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[*]Main entries are random effects MLE regression coefficients. Dependent variable = ln (Bilateral Aid/Capita + 1), in 2004 dollars. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figures

Figure 1: Relationship Between UNCHR Resolutions and Public Shaming by Human Rights
NGOs

Figure 2: ln Aggregate Bilateral Aid Per Capita for Regular and Shamed States, by Previous
Aid Package*

(a) UNCHR Resolutions

(b) NGO Shaming Events

*Observations marked as "condemned" or "any shaming events" had recorded UNCHR resolutions or a non-zero count of NGO shaming events (respectively) in the prior year.

Figure 3: Instantaneous Marginal Effect of a UNCHR Condemnation on Bilateral Economic Aid (Model 3 from Table 2)

**Instantaneous Marginal Effect
of UNCHR Resolution on Bilateral Economic Aid**

Figure 4: Dyadic Economic Aid Trajectory over Time for States With Small and Large Prior Aid Packages Condemned by the UNCHR (Model 3 from Table 2)*

(a) Recipient with Large Starting Aid Package

(b) Recipient with Small Starting Aid Package

*Shaded regions indicate that the country was condemned by a UNCHR resolution during the prior year.

Figure 5: The Instantaneous Effect of a UNCHR Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$ on Aggregate Bilateral Aid$_{it}$ (Model 2 of Table 4)

**Instantaneous Marginal Effect
of UNCHR Resolution on Aggregate Bilateral Aid**

Figure 6: Aggregate Bilateral Aid Trajectory over Time for a State Condemned by the UNCHR (Model 2 of Table 4)*

(a) Recipient with Large Starting Aid Package

simulated aid trajectory with 90% CI error bars

(b) Recipient with Small Starting Aid Package

simulated aid trajectory with 90% CI error bars

*Shaded regions indicate that the country was condemned by a UNCHR resolution during the prior year.

Online Appendix

Table 6: Dyadic Bilateral Aid Flows, Varying Initial Condition Modeling*

	(1)	(2)
UNCHR Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	-1.629***	-1.631***
	(-7.17)	(-7.26)
DV$_{i(t-1)}$	0.385***	0.371***
	(36.93)	(35.97)
DV$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	0.249***	0.243***
	(7.40)	(7.29)
Initial Value of lag DV		0.426***
		(18.97)
Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0644***	-0.0596***
	(-3.99)	(-3.72)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$	0.399	0.231
	(1.93)	(1.18)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	0.209	0.0133
	(0.33)	(0.02)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0886	-0.284
	(-0.43)	(-1.47)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	0.826**	0.889***
	(3.11)	(3.44)
UN Voting Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.179	0.189
	(-1.00)	(1.08)
UN Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	1.392**	1.454***
	(3.17)	(3.35)
Observations	35234	35234
Dyads	2088	2088
Recipients	100	100
Donors	21	21
AIC	89031.7	88690.8
BIC	89302.8	88970.3

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*Main entries are random-effects Tobit regression coefficients, with the random effects drawn by dyad. Dependent variable = ln (Economic Aid/(1000 people) + 1), in constant dollars. Variables in the model but not listed: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year, logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor state as of the prior year, donor Physical Integrity Rights score in the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year, ln aggregate global aid flows in the current year, ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Population$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Trade$_{i(t-1)}$, whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor, whether the recipient is a socialist state, a dummy for whether the year takes place during the Cold War period (pre-1992), Cold War * Socialist, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year, a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and regional fixed effects. Logged variables are coded in the source data set so that their minimum value is finite (for example, 1 is added to the number of New York Times articles that mention human rights). Models cover observations between the years 1982-2002. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Table 7: Summary Statistics for State-Years, by Murdie and Davis (2012) NGO Shaming Status and Lagged Personal Integrity Abuse Score*

	low abuse no shaming mean/sd	low abuse shaming mean/sd	high abuse no shaming mean/sd	high abuse shaming mean/sd
ln (Bilateral aid PC + 1)	3.394	3.001	2.670	2.201
	(1.149)	(0.988)	(1.249)	(1.328)
lag ln (Bilateral aid PC + 1)	3.395	2.782	2.733	2.219
	(1.166)	(0.880)	(1.254)	(1.331)
lag Civil Liberties	4.137	4.640	4.876	5.206
	(1.608)	(1.319)	(1.439)	(1.279)
lag ln GDP per capita	7.099	7.019	6.632	6.690
	(1.224)	(0.930)	(1.118)	(1.121)
lag ln Population	14.592	15.992	16.354	17.349
	(1.571)	(1.624)	(1.464)	(1.724)
lag Agreement with USA	0.361	0.350	0.333	0.328
	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.080)
lag War	0.053	0.056	0.389	0.512
	(0.224)	(0.236)	(0.488)	(0.503)
lag CINC Capabilities	0.005	0.012	0.029	0.093
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.074)	(0.187)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	1.945	-1.900	3.107	3.291
	(6.761)	(6.456)	(6.687)	(6.841)
Observations	581	25	1591	209

*Main figures are means; standard deviations in parentheses. Low abuse state-years have Gibney and Dalton (1996) Physical Integrity Abuse scores less than 2.5; high abuse state-years have scores greater than or equal to 2.5.

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Table 8: Dyadic Bilateral Aid Flows, Alternate Lags*

	(1)	(2)
UNCHR Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	-1.629***	-1.243***
	(-7.17)	(-5.54)
DV$_{i(t-1)}$	0.385***	0.343***
	(36.93)	(32.38)
DV$_{i(t-2)}$		0.259***
		(25.14)
DV$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	0.249***	0.219***
	(7.40)	(5.48)
DV$_{i(t-2)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$		0.00846
		(0.21)
Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0644***	-0.0592***
	(-3.99)	(-3.73)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$	0.399	0.311
	(1.93)	(1.67)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	0.209	0.0582
	(0.33)	(0.09)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0886	-0.0570
	(-0.43)	(-0.32)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	0.826**	0.500*
	(3.11)	(1.99)
UN Voting Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.179	-0.128
	(-1.00)	(-0.76)
UN Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	1.392**	1.271**
	(3.17)	(2.97)
Observations	35234	35234
Dyads	2088	2088
Recipients	100	100
Donors	21	21
AIC	89031.7	88365.0
BIC	89302.8	88653.0

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*Main entries are random-effects Tobit regression coefficients, with the random effects drawn by dyad. Dependent variable = ln (Economic Aid/(1000 people) + 1), in constant dollars. Variables in the model but not listed: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year, logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor state as of the prior year, donor Physical Integrity Rights score in the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year, ln aggregate global aid flows in the current year, ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Population$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Trade$_{i(t-1)}$, whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor, whether the recipient is a socialist state, a dummy for whether the year takes place during the Cold War period (pre-1992), Cold War * Socialist, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year, a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and regional fixed effects. Logged variables are coded in the source data set so that their minimum value is finite (for example, 1 is added to the number of New York Times articles that mention human rights). Models cover observations between the years 1982-2002. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Table 9: State-dependence in Dyadic Bilateral Aid Flows with Donor Physical Integrity Score Interactions*

	(1)	(2)
$\text{DV}_{i(t-1)}$	0.387***	0.387***
	(37.12)	(37.09)
Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0674***	-0.0681***
	(-4.18)	(-4.22)
UNCHR Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.939***	-2.509**
	(-6.79)	(-2.88)
$\text{DV}_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$	0.235***	0.236***
	(7.23)	(7.26)
Donor Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0212	-0.0372
	(-0.63)	(-1.07)
Donor Violations$_{i(t-1)}$ * Resolution$_{i(t-1)}$		0.211
		(1.83)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$	0.412*	0.410*
	(2.01)	(2.00)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$	0.0359	0.0351
	(0.18)	(0.17)
UN Voting Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0902	-0.0896
	(-0.51)	(-0.51)
Observations	35234	35234
Dyads	2088	2088
Recipients	100	100
Donors	21	21
AIC	89043.2	89041.9
BIC	89288.8	89296.0

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*Main entries are random-effects Tobit regression coefficients, with the random effects drawn by dyad. Dependent variable = ln (Economic Aid/(1000 people) + 1), in constant dollars. Variables in the model but not listed: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year, logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor state as of the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year, ln aggregate global aid flows in the current year, ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Population$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Trade$_{i(t-1)}$, whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor, whether the recipient is a socialist state, a dummy for whether the year takes place during the Cold War period (pre-1992), Cold War * Socialist, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year, a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and regional fixed effects. Logged variables are coded in the source data set so that their minimum value is finite (for example, 1 is added to the number of New York Times articles that mention human rights). Models cover observations between the years 1982-2002. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Table 10: Dyadic Bilateral Economic Aid Flows, Murdie and Davis (2012) NGO Shaming Measure Among Shamed Donors*

	(1)	(2)
$DV_{i(t-1)}$	0.778***	0.773***
	(38.94)	(38.49)
Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0304	-0.0304
	(-1.16)	(-1.16)
NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$	0.00333	-0.0448
	(0.15)	(-0.99)
$DV_{i(t-1)}$ * NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$		0.0118
		(1.29)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$	0.624***	0.627***
	(5.07)	(5.07)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$	0.297*	0.305*
	(2.31)	(2.36)
UN Voting Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$	0.183	0.173
	(1.10)	(1.06)
Observations	6748	6748
Dyads	1840	1840
Recipients	110	110
Donors	17	17
AIC	23289.5	23289.2
BIC	23459.9	23466.5

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*Main entries are Tobit regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by dyad. Dependent variable = ln (Economic Aid/Capita + 1), in constant dollars. Variables in the model but not listed: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year, logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor state as of the prior year, donor Physical Integrity Rights score in the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year, ln aggregate global aid flows in the current year, ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Population$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Trade$_{i(t-1)}$, whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor, whether the recipient is a socialist state, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year, a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and regional fixed effects. Models cover observations between the years 1993 and 2004. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Table 11: Dyadic Bilateral Economic Aid Flows, Murdie and Davis (2012) NGO Shaming Measure with Donor Shaming Interaction*

	(1)
$DV_{i(t-1)}$	0.878***
	(60.43)
Physical Integrity Violations$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.0323
	(-1.73)
NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$	0.0467*
	(2.54)
Donor NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)} \geq 1$	-0.0125
	(-1.65)
Donor NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)} \geq 1$ * NGO Shaming$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.00338
	(-1.16)
Alliance$_{i(t-1)}$	0.400***
	(3.58)
Ally Neighbor$_{i(t-1)}$	0.236*
	(2.09)
UN Voting Similarity$_{i(t-1)}$	-0.177
	(-1.22)
Observations	23130
Dyads	2198
Recipients	110
Donors	20
AIC	60156.8
BIC	60374.1

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

*Main entries are Tobit regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by dyad. Dependent variable = ln (Economic Aid/Capita + 1), in constant dollars. Variables in the model but not listed: ln number of refugees leaving the recipient state in the prior year, logged number of New York Times articles that mention human rights in connection with the recipient in the prior year, the proportion of six UN human rights treaties ratified by the donor state as of the prior year, donor Physical Integrity Rights score in the prior year, recipient Polity IV score in the prior year, ln aggregate global aid flows in the current year, ln GDP per capita$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Population$_{i(t-1)}$, ln Trade$_{i(t-1)}$, whether the recipient is a former colony of the donor, whether the recipient is a socialist state, a binary indicator of whether the recipient was fighting a war in the prior year, a dummy for post-2001 ("war on terror"), and regional fixed effects. Models cover observations between the years 1993 and 2004. p-values are reported for two-tailed tests.

Figure 7: Instantaneous Marginal Effect of Any NGO Shaming Events on Bilateral Economic Aid (Model 4 from Table 3)

Figure 8: Comparative Model Fit Assessment, Models 2 and 3 from Table 2

(a) Model Fit: Rwanda / UK Dyad

(b) Model Fit: Peru / Germany Dyad

(c) Model Fit: Morocco / France Dyad