Gender and Voter Punishment of Corruption

Preliminary version: This paper is under active development. The results and conclusions reported may change as research continues.

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Abstract

Why is corruption lower when more women are involved in governance? We examine two explanations using data from a conjoint survey experiment in Latin America embedded in the AmericasBarometer and first analyzed by Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020). First, we study whether voters provide more *extrinsic* motivation for female politicians to avoid corruption by holding women incumbents to a higher ethical standard than men. Second, we test whether women have a greater *intrinsic* aversion to corruption. The experiment exposes survey respondents to two mayoral candidate profiles, randomly assigning candidate gender and involvement in corruption, and asks them to choose for whom they would vote. Our results indicate that expected voter support for corrupt male politicians is lower than that for equivalent corrupt women. We also find qualified evidence that a smaller share of female voters support a corrupt candidate compared to male voters.

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Introduction

Extant research supports the conclusion that greater participation by women in government can cause reduced corruption in that government (Jha and Sarangi, 2018; Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Paweenawat, 2018; Bauhr, Charron and Wängnerud, 2018; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2019). But the reason *why* this causal relationship exists is far from clear. There are many plausible explanations, and most are not mutually exclusive with one another. One potential explanation is that female politicians are held to a higher moral standard than their male counterparts (Batista Pereira, 2020). Another is that women are more empathetic and focused on the common good than men and bring these values into office with them (Wängnerud, 2020). These and other causal mechanisms linking gender to corruption appear to be sensitive to context, activated by some and de-activated by others (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013).

In this study, we look for evidence of these two potential mechanisms linking gender to corruption in data from a conjoint survey experiment in three Latin American countries described by Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020).[1] The experiment asked respondents to choose between two mayoral candidates whose characteristics varied on multiple dimensions; most importantly for our purposes, two of these characteristics were gender and alleged corruption. This research design allows us to pose and answer two questions. First, does corruption hurt voter support for female candidates more than it does for equivalent male candidates? If so, we could conclude that (at least in some instances) voters hold women to a higher ethical standard than men and thereby provide an *extrinsic* incentive for women politicians to avoid corruption more than their male counterparts. If corruption reduces support for men more than women, we might instead conclude that voters expect female candidates to be *intrinsically* more ethical even when suspected of corruption. Second, are female voters less likely than male voters to support candidates involved in corruption? If so, it would support the claim that women bring different *intrinsic* values to bear when making political choices;

[1] This experiment was embedded in the AmericasBarometer surveys in 2017 (LAPOP, 2020).

the survey respondents are not professional politicians, but a value gap among voters would be consistent with such a value gap among their representatives.

We find that voters punish male candidates involved in corruption scandals more than equivalent women in the survey experiment. Specifically, the effect of alleged corruption on a woman candidate's vote share is substantially smaller than the effect for a man with comparable characteristics. We also find qualified evidence that on average a smaller share of women voters supports corrupt incumbents compared to male voters. We infer that women are intrinsically more resistant to corruption than men, at least in the three Latin American countries studied in this data set. Ergo, intrinsic gender differences may explain at least a part of the gender corruption link in this context; extrinsic incentives from voters appear to play little role. We find no evidence to corroborate Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner's (2018) finding that women voters punish female politicians for corruption more than male voters.

We are hesitant to conclude that internalized value differences are a universally suitable explanation for why more women in government seems to reduce corruption. Our evidence is that some form of intrinsic gender difference is at work at this time and place. However, many other well-designed studies fail to find such a mechanism in other cases. We therefore conclude that the overall pattern of findings, in this paper and in the literature as a whole, supports the context-sensitivity of the causal link between gender and corruption. If relevant gender differences are a product of society and culture, they may only exist at some times and places. They may be activated or de-activated by institutional context (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013). Perhaps the effect of intrinsic differences on corruption may fail to be detected unless the study has sufficient statistical power. The positive results could be anomalous and an artifact of publication bias (Scargle, 2000).

In analyzing the data used in our study, Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020) found that candidate gender does not moderate the effect of corruption on voter behavior. A recent study of the same data by Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder (2021) argues that in general voters treat corrupt women candidates similar to men, although in Uruguay they receive slightly *more* support from voters than men in some circumstances. We believe that we detect effects when prior work did not because our analysis uses more efficient regression models that are statistically and substantively justified by the evidence. We also analyze the data dyadically, capturing respondents' choice between two candidates, in addition to refining the monadic analysis of prior work. Our dyadic analysis brings new and important evidence to bear on the question of how voters punish corruption (or not).

Theory and Background

After an initial debate about spuriousness (Sung, 2003; Goetz, 2007), multiple studies have confirmed the conclusion of Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001): greater participation by women in government can reduce corruption in that government, at least in some contexts. For example, instrumental variables models (Correa Martínez and Jetter, 2016; Jha and Sarangi, 2018; Paweenawat, 2018; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2019) have shown that an increased proportion of women in public life[2] can cause reduced corruption at the country level. A regression discontinuity design among municipalities in Brazil reports the same finding (Brollo and Troiano, 2016). In India, random assignment of a female gender quota to local governments reduced bribery in those governments compared to those without a quota (Beaman et al., 2009). There are a large number of theoretical explanations for this relationship (Wängnerud, 2014; Wängnerud, 2020), all of which are difficult to definitively falsify given the contextual sensitivity of the gender-corruption relationship (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2018).

Consider the possibility that voters punish female politicians more harshly for corruption than their male counterparts. If true, it would explain (at least in part) why greater involvement of women in government reduces corruption but only when politicians are highly accountable to voters (Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits, 2016; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2018):

[2]The precise measure is either of the proportion of women in parliament (Jha and Sarangi, 2018; Paweenawat, 2018; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2019) or participation by women in the labor force (Correa Martínez and Jetter, 2016).

they have a stronger *extrinsic* incentive than men to avoid corruption in these circumstances.[3] Moreover, there is empirical evidence to support this proposition. Survey experiments by Batista Pereira (2020) discover that voters in Mexico are less supportive of women politicians accused of corruption compared to men. Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner (2018) conducts similar experiments in the UK, finding that voters in general do not punish women more harshly than men for corruption but *women* voters are less likely to vote for women involved in corruption compared to equivalent male politicians. These findings are possibly attributable to voters having higher moral expectations for women.[4] Barnes and Beaulieu (2014) finds that US survey respondents expect female politicians to be less corrupt than equivalent men; Schwindt-Bayer, Esarey and Schumacher (2018) finds the same expectation in both the US and Brazil. Barnes and Beaulieu (2018) and Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton (2018) confirm these findings and are able to attribute them to voters' belief that women are more risk-averse.

But there is also a substantial body of empirical evidence that voters treat men and women involved with corruption the same way. Survey experiments described in Schwindt-Bayer, Esarey and Schumacher (2018) find no evidence for differential punishment of corruption by voters in the United States; Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton (2020) comes to the same conclusion using a different survey experiment from the US. The aforementioned study by Batista Pereira (2020) also finds no such evidence among voters in Brazil. Most recently, Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder (2021) finds that Uruguayans actually *prefer* allegedly corrupt women politicians to equivalent men while voters in Argentina and Chile do not treat corrupt politicians differently by gender. Diaz and Senters Piazza (2021) reports that, while corruption can spur the entry of female candidates for mayoral office in Brazil, it does *not*

[3] The key distinction between *extrinsic* and *intrinsic* motivation is the presence (or absence) of an external reward. Frey (1997, p. 13) notes that "people change their actions because they are induced to do so by an external intervention... Economic theory thus takes *extrinsic motivation* to be relevant for behavior." By contrast, "one is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when he receives no apparent rewards except the activity itself" (Deci 1971, p. 105, as quoted on p. 13 of Frey 1997).

[4] Higher moral expectations for women's behavior have been linked to sexist attitudes in prior work (e.g., Glick and Fiske, 1996; Ramos et al., 2018; Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton, 2020).

increase their chances of winning the election.

Thus, the overall picture that emerges from previous work is quite confusing. There are sound reasons to believe that voters expect women to be less corrupt than men in a variety of contexts. We even find some evidence for harsher punishment of corrupt women by voters in some studies. But in others, we find either mixed evidence or positive refutation of no such differential punishment. It is unclear *why* we find such inconsistent evidence; there are many possible explanations.

There is a similarly confusing pattern of support for the thesis that women politicians bring distinct values or ethical commitments to public office that displace corruption. If women had a greater *intrinsic* motivation to fight corruption than men, it would be easy to explain a causal connection between female participation in government and corruption. Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) offered this as an explanation for their early findings. Later studies by Esarey and Chirillo (2013), Barnes and Beaulieu (2018), and many others claimed to rule out this explanation by finding that the gender-corruption relationship is sensitive to context. But Wängnerud (2020) re-advances the value-based argument based on evidence from Wängnerud, Solevid and Djerf-Pierre (2019) and a re-interpretation of prior evidence. Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder (2021), for example, offers this explanation for their results in Uruguay.

Our survey of the literature leads us to look for two possible relationships in a survey conjoint experiment of voters in Latin America:

Hypothesis 1. ***Differential punishment****: Respondents are less likely to vote for female candidates implicated in corruption compared to equivalent male counterparts.*

Differential punishment by voters of women candidates for corruption provides an *extrinsic* motivation for female candidates to avoid corruption more than otherwise equivalent men.

Hypothesis 2. ***Value differences****: Female respondents are less likely to vote for candidates implicated in corruption compared to male respondents.*

If women have a greater *intrinsic* aversion to corruption compared to men, we would expect women voters to be more strongly motivated to avoid corrupt candidates compared to male voters.

There are also two hypotheses that come directly from previous empirical work:

Hypothesis 3. *Female respondents are less likely to vote for women candidates implicated in corruption compared to male respondents.*

Hypothesis 4. *Respondents are more likely to vote for female candidates implicated in corruption compared to equivalent male counterparts.*

Hypothesis 3 revisits the finding of Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner (2018) that women voters more harshly punish women politicians, implying that there are gender-specific double standards for corrupt politicians. This idea is consistent with an extrinsic incentive for women politicians to avoid corruption, but conditioned by the different preferences of male and female voters. Hypothesis 4 comes directly from Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder (2021, p. 3), based on the "essentialist and structuralist reasoning" that women are more resistant to corruption than men and thus preferable to voters.

A primary goal of this paper (and an improvement over prior work) is to help rule out some explanations for the inconsistency in prior work. In particular, inconsistent findings could be the product of a statistical artifact, such as low-powered studies and/or publication bias. Consequently, we design our study to look for relatively small effects that are easily missed in a low-powered statistical analysis but large enough to be politically meaningful. For example, if voter support for corrupt female politicians is 1-2 percentage points different compared to that for corrupt men, the effect could be difficult to detect in a small sample but large enough to decide an election outcome. Differential punishment of this magnitude would not be enough to explain the entire connection between gender and corruption observed, but could explain some portion of it. Similarly, if women politicians bring slightly different values to public office, this would be difficult to detect in a smaller data set. A relatively small causal impact of intrinsic value differences might explain part of the gender-corruption connection even if it cannot explain it all. A set of small effects like these could cumulate to a larger aggregate relationship in places where they all pushed in the same direction but no relationship where they were muted or pushed in opposing directions; that would also explain why the gender-corruption relationship in aggregate data is so dependent on context.

Data

Our study uses data first analyzed by Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020) and collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2017 as a part of the AmericasBarometer survey (LAPOP, 2020). Nationally representative surveys were collected by LAPOP in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Survey respondents were presented with a vignette concerning two mayoral candidates. The characteristics of those candidates were randomly varied by subject; this procedure allows calculation of an Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) using simple regression analysis with each treatment as a binary independent variable (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). The AMCE cannot be interpreted as the "true" preference of a target population of voters for an attribute (Abramson, Kocak and Magazinnik, 2019) because such collective preferences are generally not well-defined (Arrow, 1963). But the AMCE *can* be interpreted as the expected vote share difference induced by an attribute, averaging over the distribution of candidate profiles in the experiment and over the distribution of voter types in the subject pool (Bansak et al., 2020).[5] However, it is important to remember that this experimental estimate is conditional on the distribution of characteristics in the candidate profiles from the experiment; marginal effects in live elections may be influenced by factors not present in the survey experiment (Boas, Hidalgo and Melo, 2019).

Most pertinent to this study, the gender of each candidate and their involvement with

[5]This interpretation applies to a forced-choice experiment (pp. 10-11), but the experiment we study allows abstention. We therefore must be careful to note that our results pertain to expected changes in candidate vote shares including abstention as an option, not shares of a two-party vote that would determine a winner.

	Mean	SD	Sum
Vote for Candidate	0.288	0.453	2499
Candidate: Female	0.510	0.500	4757
Respondent: Female	0.511	0.500	4772
Argentina	0.327	0.469	3056
Chile	0.348	0.476	3250
Uruguay	0.324	0.468	3028
Treatment: Fought bribery	0.247	0.431	2303
Treatment: Bribes	0.259	0.438	2418
Treatment: Bribes common	0.247	0.431	2303
Treatment: Bribes but jobs	0.247	0.431	2304
N	9334		

Table 1: Summary statistics from the survey experiment.

corruption was randomly assigned. Specifically, each mayoral candidate was described as someone who (a) fought bribes, (b) accepted bribes, (c) accepted bribes when doing so was a common and widespread practice, and (d) accepted bribes that brought construction jobs to the community. The subjects were then asked "if you had to choose between these two candidates, for whom would you vote?" About 43% of respondents saw at least one clean candidate in their comparison; voting for neither candidate (abstaining) was an option. Because the other randomly varied candidate attributes in this experiment are few in number and relatively benign (viz. partisanship and the source of corruption information) and the respondents come from nationally representative samples, we think that the AMCE is relevant for studying elections in the target countries.

Summary statistics for the study are shown in Table 1. As indicated in the table, roughly 1/3 of the sample comes from Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay and roughly 1/4 of the sample is randomly assigned to each of the four bribery treatment conditions. Just over half of the candidate descriptions were of a female candidate, and just over half of the respondents were female. As discussed by Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020), subjects' support for candidates is relatively low in this experiment because so many of them are described as being involved in corruption; over 42% of respondents voted for neither candidate in their vignette.

Model Selection and Statistical Power

The structure of the data creates potential bias/variance trade-offs in the choice of how to conduct the analysis. For example, there are respondents from three different countries in the data set. If these countries respond in completely different ways to the treatment, a split-sample analysis or a multi-level model with varying slopes and intercepts is required. However, if countries respond in the same way to these treatments, a simpler model with country-specific intercepts would suffice. Similarly, if there is a different gender gap in response to each variation of bribery treatment (accepting bribes, accepting them when it is a common and widespread practice, and accepting them to bring construction jobs to the community), each must be separately interacted with candidate and respondent gender. But if the difference between men and women is constant across the treatments, consolidating the interaction with gender is possible.

These specification choices are particularly important for our study because our key objective is to gain greater statistical power than prior studies in order to detect relatively small causal influences of gender on corruption: more complex models will necessarily have less power. In both of the instances described above, choosing the more complex model would result in less expected bias. Even if the simpler model would work, the more complex model would still recover the results in an infinitely-sized sample. But no sample is infinite, let alone the one we are analyzing. Our data set contains just over 3,000 observations from each of three countries. Estimating a separate model on each country for all treatments separately and with an interaction between each treatment and the candidate's gender results in a ratio of between 350 and 380 observations per estimated parameter. A pooled country fixed effects model of reduced complexity, estimating separate effects for each treatment but assuming that the difference between male and female candidates' treatment effect is the same for each treatment, results in just over 1083 observations being available per parameter. The parameters in the latter model will obviously be estimated with much less variability than those in the former model. Thus, in any particular sample (i.e., our sample), the estimates from the simplified model may be more accurate than those from the more complex model (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009, pp. 37-38) and we will have more power to detect small relationships.

Our theory does not make a prediction about how gender interacts with voters' response to the different bribery treatments in this experiment. Consequently, our primary concern with this specification choice is to make an optimal bias/variance trade-off. We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to choose the model that provides the best representation of the (unknown) underlying data generating process (see Claeskens and Hjort, 2008, Sections 2.3 and 3.2).

Empirical Analysis

We begin with a monadic OLS regression of subject vote choice. In this type of analysis, the same approach taken by Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020) and Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder (2021), each subject has two entries in the data set corresponding to the candidates they see. Concordantly, standard errors are clustered by subject.[6]

Model Selection Results

First, we must decide whether the three countries in the data set should be analyzed separately. In Appendix Table 2, we separate the samples by treatment condition, estimate a model of vote choice with full interaction between candidate gender and country in each subsample, estimate a second model setting the effect of candidate gender equal in all three countries, then compare the AIC and BIC for these models. In seven out of eight comparisons, the AIC/BIC prefers the pooled model where all three countries share the same response to the treatment and the same effect of gender. When combined with the similar magnitude of country-specific estimates, this is strong evidence that a more efficient pooled

[6]Unless otherwise noted, figures based on estimated models use a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons based on the number of effects displayed in the figure.

analysis should be preferred. For models studying the effect of respondent gender on vote choice, shown in Appendix Table 3, the BIC always prefers pooling the analysis by country and the AIC prefers pooling in two out of four models.

Next, we must determine if it is preferable to separately estimate interactions between gender and each treatment separately or whether we can consolidate them into a single interaction term. Our analysis in Appendix Table 4 and 5 supports consolidation of all interactions of gender with the three bribery treatments into a single interaction. It may be the case that there are small differences in response to the treatments among countries or differences in the strength of the gender moderator among treatments that are too small to detect in this sample. However, because these differences are so small, it is preferable to pool the sample and obtain a large reduction in variance (and greater statistical power) in exchange for a small amount of bias, as discussed above (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009). Consequently, we will focus on findings from the simplified models of Appendix Table 4 and 5.

Analysis by Candidate Gender

Appendix Table 4 shows fixed-effect models (by country) of binary vote choice with a variable for candidate gender and interactions between treatment condition and candidate gender. We estimate models for the full sample as well as separately for female and male survey respondent subpopulations. The Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) derived from this model are graphically depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows no evidence for gender discrimination against ordinary politicians: there is a near-zero point estimate for the effect of candidate gender in the non-bribery treatment. However, the expected vote share[7] of a female candidate implicated in bribery is about 3 percentage points higher compared to an equivalent male candidate. This effect is small, but

[7]See Bansak et al. (2020), noting that this expectation averages over the probability density of candidate characteristics in the experiment and of respondent characteristics in the subject pool. Note also that this change in vote share includes those who change from abstention.



Figure 1: AMCE of candidate gender on voting based on Models 2, 4, and 6 from Appendix Table 4. Lines are Bonferroni-corrected 95% and 80% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by subject.

statistically significant, in the full sample ($p < 0.05$, two-tailed with Bonferroni correction). Moreover, a 3 percentage point difference in support can be very substantively significant in a close election: it can be the difference between victory and defeat. The estimated effects in the subsamples of female and male respondents are similar in sign and magnitude, albeit not as statistically certain. We therefore conclude that there is no support for the differential punishment hypothesis (H1) in this data set. There is, however, support for Hypothesis 4: on average, a larger share of respondents will vote for female candidates accused of corruption compared to equivalent men.

Our results for the effect of respondent gender, shown in Figure 2, are not as clear-cut. On one hand, female voters seem to punish candidates for involvement for corruption more than male voters; specifically, women on average provide 3 percentage points less support to a candidate accused of bribery compared to male voters ($p < 0.05$, two-tailed with Bonferroni correction). On the other hand, although there is no statistically detectable effect



Figure 2: AMCE of respondent gender on voting based on Models 2, 4, and 6 in Appendix Table 5. Lines are Bonferroni-corrected 95% and 80% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by subject.

of respondent gender on candidate support in the "resist bribes" treatment, the estimated magnitudes are very close to the estimated magnitudes in the bribe treatments. We therefore have reason to doubt whether there is a real difference in respondent behavior when comparing the treatment and control conditions. Thus, we believe that there is qualified support for the value differences hypothesis (H2) in the data set but interpret this finding cautiously. Finally, when comparing the female and male respondents, we see no substantively meaningful difference in support for women candidates implicated in bribery as compared to male candidates; consequently we firmly reject Hypothesis 3.

Dyadic Analysis

While Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020) and Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder (2021) used a monadic analysis on this data, there is good reason to believe that subjects' vote choice depends not just on each candidate's characteristics but how they compare to one another.

We therefore reshaped the data set so that each respondent corresponded to one observation where vote choice indicated whether they would vote for the incumbent (= 1) or not (= 0, a vote for the challenger or an abstention). Both incumbent and challenger characteristics were used predictors of this choice. This reshaping maintains the characteristics of a conjoint experiment, the only difference being that the randomly varied characteristics of both candidates are considered as treatments influencing the choice to vote for an incumbent.

Figure 3 shows the AMCE of incumbent gender for female and male incumbents in each possible combination of treatment conditions based on an OLS model shown in Appendix Table 6. Contrary to the differential punishment hypothesis (H1), women incumbents receive around 5 percentage points more support from respondents compared to equivalent men when they are alleged to accept bribes. However, this effect may depend on the gender of the challenger as well as the incumbent.



Figure 3: AMCE of incumbent gender on voting under all treatment combinations, based on Model 2 in Appendix Table 6. Lines are Bonferroni-corrected 95% and 80% confidence intervals.

Figure 4 shows the AMCE of candidate gender for incumbents accused of accepting bribes depending on whether the challenger accepted bribes as well as the challenger's gender; these predictions are based on OLS models in Appendix Table 7. The biggest difference in support for corrupt women politicians (relative to male counterparts) is in the condition where a male challenger fought bribes; this is consistent with the supposition of Hypothesis 4 that allegations of corruption are less plausible for women (and reports of resistance to corruption are less plausible for men). The magnitude of this effect is large, with corrupt incumbent women receiving (on average) well over ten percentage points more support than corrupt incumbent men. There is a smaller, marginally statistically significant advantage for corrupt women when a male challenger is also accused of corruption; this could reflect voters' greater skepticism of corruption allegations applied to women compared to men. Finally, there is no statistically detectable difference in support for corrupt women politicians compared to men when the challenger is female.



Figure 4: AMCE of incumbent gender on voting when the incumbent accepts bribes, based on Appendix Table 7. Lines are Bonferroni-corrected 95% and 80% confidence intervals.

As in the monadic analysis, there is qualified support for the value differences hypothesis

(H2) in the data. Figure 5 shows the AMCE of respondent gender. In Figure 5b, this quantity is estimated separately for each of the possible combinations of treatment conditions (consolidating all bribery treatments) using the estimates from OLS model 2 in Appendix Table 8. Figure 5b shows the AMCE of respondent female gender on incumbent vote share is negative for incumbents who accepted bribes; however, none of these differences is statistically significant at conventional levels. If we further consolidate the analysis to compare all treatments where incumbents fought bribes to all treatments where they didn't, as in Figure 5a, we find that the AMCE of respondent female gender is about -3.8 percentage points for incumbents who accepted bribes whilst there is no difference in support for incumbents who fought bribes. However, the magnitude of the AMCE is similar for both cases; only the uncertainty is greater for incumbents who fought bribes. In addition, the AIC and BIC model selection criteria prefer the more complex model of Figure 5b. Consequently, this support for Hypothesis 2 should be interpreted cautiously.

Finally, and as in the monadic analysis, we find no support for Hypothesis 3 in the dyadic data set. Figure 6 shows the AMCE of incumbent gender under the four treatment conditions in the survey experiment, estimated separately for male and female respondents, based on Models 1 and 2 in Appendix Table 9. It is immediately apparent that there is no substantively meaningful difference in the treatment of female and male candidates by respondent gender. These findings contradict Hypothesis 3.

Conclusion

The balance of our analysis suggests the following substantive inferences about the link between gender and corruption in Latin America:

1. Voters appear less likely to punish women politicians implicated in bribery compared to their male counterparts, as we infer from the subjects' greater expected support for corrupt female candidates in the survey experiment. This is consistent with the idea



(a) Model 1



(b) Model 2

Figure 5: AMCE of respondent gender on voting based on models in Appendix Table 8. Lines indicate Bonferroni-corrected 95% and 80% confidence intervals.



Figure 6: AMCE of incumbent and respondent gender on voting, based on Appendix Table 9 models (1) and (2). Lines are Bonferroni-corrected 95% and 80% confidence intervals.

that voters expect women to be intrinsically less corrupt.

2. Women subjects are on average less supportive of candidates implicated in corruption. This is consistent with the idea that women prioritize corruption as a political issue, perhaps due to different internalized values.

We do *not* find evidence that women voters hold women politicians to a higher standard, as was seen in Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner (2018). Nor do we find evidence for dramatically different behavior within Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, although small differences might be detectable in a larger sample.

How do our findings speak to the larger question of why gender and corruption are causally linked? We believe that the answer is more complicated than the apparently direct implication that women are intrinsically more averse to corruption than men. Of course, that is true. But we also cannot ignore the weight of prior evidence suggesting no such connections in other contexts.

We are therefore reluctant to conclude that value differences between men and women fully explain the relationship between women in parliament and corruption that we see in cross-national data. Surely they play a role in this link at some places and times, as they seem to do in contemporary Latin America. But the larger history of this research program indicates that there are many potential explanations, that some of these explanations fail in important contexts, and that in other contexts there appears to be evidence for multiple causal mechanisms operating simultaneously (e.g., Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2019). Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from this research going forward is that the push and pull of multiple causal mechanisms drives the larger phenomenon of an aggregate causal relationship from female representation in government to reduced corruption.

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Appendix A: Vignette Experiment Text

The English translation of the text for the conjoint survey experiment vignette is taken from Section A2, page 4 of the online appendix for Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2020). The terms in brackets represent the changes in wording randomly assigned as part of the treatment.

> Imagine that you are voting in an election for mayor with two candidates. The economic conditions of the municipality have [improved/worsened] since the last election.
>
> [María / Alberto] López is the incumbent [<right party> / <left party> / independent] mayor running for reelection. [The newspaper <left newspaper> / The newspaper <right newspaper> / Judicial officials] [praised López's efforts to punish public employees accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions / accused López of accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions during [her / his] term / accused López of accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions during [her / his] term, a practice that was then common throughout the province / accused López of accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions during [her / his] term, but some suggest that this practice brought construction jobs to the municipality].
>
> The other candidate is [Isabel / Juan] Arias from [<right party> / <leftparty> / independent]. Arias had been the mayor of the municipality before López took office. [The newspaper <left newspaper> / The newspaper <right newspaper> / Judicial officials] [praised Arias's efforts to punish public employees accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions / accused Arias of accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions during [her / his] term / accused Arias of accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions during [her / his] term, a practice that was then common throughout the province / accused Arias of accepting bribes in exchange for public concessions during [her / his] term, but some suggest that this practice brought construction jobs to the municipality].

Appendix B: OLS Model Tables

Table 2: Test for Pooling Models by Country, Candidate Gender

	Bribes		Bribes w/ Side Benefits		Widespread Bribes		Fought Bribes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Chile	0.0258		0.0195		-0.00422		-0.00422	
	(0.94)		(0.60)		(-0.16)		(-0.16)	
Uruguay	-0.0179		-0.0699*		0.0254		0.0254	
	(-0.67)		(-2.22)		(0.89)		(0.89)	
Candidate: Female		0.0285		0.0298		0.0255		0.0255
		(1.74)		(1.54)		(1.56)		(1.56)
Argentina x Female	0.0461		0.0350		-0.000799		-0.000799	
	(1.57)		(1.00)		(-0.03)		(-0.03)	
Chile x Female	0.0185		-0.00280		0.0384		0.0384	
	(0.68)		(-0.09)		(1.38)		(1.38)	
Uruguay x Female	0.0326		0.0118		0.0584*		0.0584*	
	(1.14)		(0.35)		(2.04)		(2.04)	
Intercept (Baseline: Argentina)	0.166***	0.169***	0.273***	0.256***	0.153***	0.160***	0.153***	0.160***
	(8.49)	(15.38)	(11.78)	(19.63)	(7.81)	(14.21)	(7.81)	(14.21)
N	2260	2260	2142	2142	2151	2151	2151	2151
AIC	2126.0	2121.4	2606.4	2607.8	1925.0	1922.8	1925.0	1922.8
BIC	2160.3	2132.9	2640.5	2619.1	1959.0	1934.2	1959.0	1934.2

t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by subject.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3: Test for Pooling Models by Country, Respondent Gender

	Bribes		Bribes w/ Side Benefits		Widespread Bribes		Fought Bribes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Chile	-0.0326		-0.0182		0.0157		0.0157	
	(-1.13)		(-0.54)		(0.58)		(0.58)	
Uruguay	-0.0796**		-0.0294		0.0765**		0.0765**	
	(-2.78)		(-0.88)		(2.62)		(2.62)	
Respondent: Female		-0.00427		-0.0336		-0.0523***		-0.0523***
		(-0.27)		(-1.81)		(-3.34)		(-3.34)
Argentina x Female	-0.0653*		-0.0304		-0.0365		-0.0365	
	(-2.29)		(-0.91)		(-1.39)		(-1.39)	
Chile x Female	-0.0380		-0.0285		-0.0163		-0.0163	
	(-1.32)		(-0.89)		(-0.62)		(-0.62)	
Uruguay x Female	-0.0232		-0.0924**		-0.0188		-0.0188	
	(-0.79)		(-2.91)		(-0.73)		(-0.73)	
Intercept (Baseline: Argentina)	0.223***	0.185***	0.305***	0.289***	0.170***	0.199***	0.170***	0.199***
	(10.12)	(16.31)	(12.72)	(21.25)	(9.05)	(17.21)	(9.05)	(17.21)
N	2260	2260	2142	2142	2151	2151	2151	2151
AIC	2122.7	2124.4	2609.5	2607.2	1914.6	1915.0	1914.6	1915.0
BIC	2157.0	2135.9	2643.5	2618.5	1948.7	1926.3	1948.7	1926.3

t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by subject.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4: OLS Models of vote choice by candidate gender

	All Respondents		Female Respondents		Male Respondents	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bribes	-0.374***	-0.373***	-0.363***	-0.366***	-0.385***	-0.379***
	(-19.64)	(-20.60)	(-13.41)	(-14.11)	(-14.31)	(-14.94)
Bribes common	-0.382***	-0.384***	-0.398***	-0.401***	-0.364***	-0.365***
	(-19.82)	(-21.07)	(-14.56)	(-15.34)	(-13.32)	(-14.36)
Bribes but jobs	-0.287***	-0.285***	-0.299***	-0.293***	-0.271***	-0.276***
	(-13.94)	(-15.11)	(-10.37)	(-10.93)	(-9.20)	(-10.31)
Candidate: Female	-0.0110	-0.0110	-0.0194	-0.0194	-0.00263	-0.00263
	(-0.51)	(-0.51)	(-0.62)	(-0.62)	(-0.09)	(-0.09)
Bribes X C: Female	0.0405		0.0370		0.0442	
	(1.51)		(0.96)		(1.18)	
Bribes common X C: Female	0.0360		0.0376		0.0303	
	(1.34)		(1.00)		(0.80)	
Bribes but jobs X C: Female	0.0423		0.0580		0.0243	
	(1.46)		(1.41)		(0.59)	
Any bribe treatment X C: Female		0.0396		0.0442		0.0332
		(1.68)		(1.30)		(1.01)
Chile	-0.00957	-0.00953	-0.00626	-0.00632	-0.0119	-0.0121
	(-1.06)	(-1.06)	(-0.49)	(-0.49)	(-0.94)	(-0.95)
Uruguay	0.0103	0.0103	0.0102	0.0101	0.0122	0.0121
	(1.15)	(1.15)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.96)	(0.95)
Constant	0.542***	0.542***	0.534***	0.534***	0.549***	0.549***
	(33.81)	(33.82)	(22.93)	(22.93)	(24.85)	(24.87)
Observations	8668	8668	4408	4408	4260	4260
AIC	9934.5	9930.6	4893.4	4889.9	5041.6	5037.9
BIC	10005.2	9987.1	4957.3	4941.0	5105.2	5088.8

t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by subject.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5: OLS Models of vote choice by respondent gender

	All Candidates		Female Candidates		Male Candidates	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bribes	-0.362***	-0.349***	-0.341***	-0.333***	-0.385***	-0.366***
	(-19.06)	(-19.62)	(-12.89)	(-13.43)	(-14.31)	(-14.54)
Bribes common	-0.347***	-0.359***	-0.333***	-0.346***	-0.364***	-0.375***
	(-18.27)	(-20.29)	(-12.60)	(-14.00)	(-13.32)	(-14.84)
Bribes but jobs	-0.259***	-0.261***	-0.248***	-0.243***	-0.271***	-0.279***
	(-12.43)	(-13.95)	(-8.54)	(-9.33)	(-9.17)	(-10.57)
Respondent: Female	-0.0222	-0.0222	-0.0305	-0.0305	-0.0123	-0.0123
	(-1.10)	(-1.10)	(-1.06)	(-1.07)	(-0.41)	(-0.40)
Bribes X R: Female	0.0180		0.0160		0.0223	
	(0.67)		(0.42)		(0.58)	
Bribes common X R: Female	-0.0313		-0.0272		-0.0340	
	(-1.16)		(-0.73)		(-0.88)	
Bribes but jobs X R: Female	-0.0115		0.00695		-0.0295	
	(-0.40)		(0.17)		(-0.71)	
Any bribe treatment X R: Female		-0.00785		-0.00143		-0.0130
		(-0.33)		(-0.04)		(-0.38)
Chile	-0.00889	-0.00916	-0.0177	-0.0178	-0.000221	-0.00101
	(-0.99)	(-1.02)	(-1.22)	(-1.23)	(-0.02)	(-0.07)
Uruguay	0.0114	0.0110	0.0268	0.0264	-0.00501	-0.00555
	(1.27)	(1.23)	(1.82)	(1.79)	(-0.34)	(-0.38)
Constant	0.547***	0.547***	0.543***	0.543***	0.550***	0.551***
	(36.95)	(36.97)	(25.00)	(25.02)	(24.37)	(24.40)
Observations	8668	8668	4398	4398	4270	4270
AIC	9929.0	9928.7	5194.1	5191.6	4736.2	4735.3
BIC	9999.7	9985.3	5258.0	5242.7	4799.8	4786.1

t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by subject.

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 6: OLS Dyadic Models of vote choice by treatment status

	(1)	(2)
Female Incumbent	0.0167	
	(0.55)	
Incumbent Bribed	-0.342***	
	(-14.27)	
Female Inc. X Incumbent Bribed	0.0372	
	(1.10)	
Male Inc., Incumbent Accepted Bribe		-0.263***
		(-5.94)
Male Inc., Challenger Accepted Bribe		0.209***
		(4.31)
Male Inc., Both Accepted Bribe		-0.166***
		(-3.88)
Female Inc., Neither Accepted Bribe		0.0467
		(0.80)
Female Inc., Incumbent Accepted Bribe		-0.192***
		(-4.20)
Female Inc., Challenger Accepted Bribe		0.215***
		(4.47)
Female Inc., Both Accepted Bribe		-0.118**
		(-2.74)
Chile	0.00675	0.00676
	(0.42)	(0.43)
Uruguay	0.0479**	0.0465**
	(2.96)	(2.89)
Constant	0.508***	0.356***
	(21.21)	(8.38)
N	4334	4334
AIC	5020.0	4964.4
BIC	5058.3	5028.1

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7: OLS Dyadic Models of vote choice when incumbent bribed

	Male Challengers	Female Challengers
Female Incumbent	0.00306	0.139***
	(0.09)	(3.91)
Challenger Bribed	0.0681*	0.128***
	(2.27)	(5.07)
Female Inc. X Challenger Bribed	0.0348	-0.0806
	(0.81)	(-1.89)
Chile	0.00836	0.0451
	(0.34)	(1.86)
Uruguay	0.0167	0.0344
	(0.67)	(1.40)
Constant	0.136***	0.0469
	(4.76)	(1.91)
N	1620	1654

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: OLS Dyadic Models of vote choice by respondent gender

	(1)	(2)
Female respondent	-0.0246	
	(-0.81)	
Incumbent bribed	-0.316***	
	(-13.26)	
Female respondent X Incumbent bribed	-0.0131	
	(-0.39)	
Male respondent, Incumbent bribed		-0.225***
		(-5.17)
Male respondent, Challenger bribed		0.212***
		(4.58)
Male respondent, Both bribed		-0.148***
		(-3.61)
Female respondent, Neither bribed		0.000615
		(0.01)
Female respondent, Incumbent bribed		-0.275***
		(-6.48)
Female respondent, Challenger bribed		0.165***
		(3.57)
Female respondent, Both bribed		-0.182***
		(-4.48)
Chile	0.00735	0.00734
	(0.46)	(0.46)
Constant	0.529***	0.379***
	(22.60)	(9.45)
Uruguay	0.0481**	0.0464**
	(2.97)	(2.89)
N	4334	4334
AIC	5026.1	4969.7
BIC	5064.3	5033.5

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9: OLS Dyadic Models of vote choice by candidate and respondent gender

	(1) Male Respondents	(2) Female Respondents	(3) All Respondents
Male Inc., Incumbent Accepted Bribe	-0.234***	-0.293***	-0.263***
	(-3.75)	(-4.63)	(-5.94)
Male Inc., Challenger Accepted Bribe	0.222**	0.196**	0.209***
	(3.28)	(2.82)	(4.31)
Male Inc., Both Accepted Bribe	-0.144*	-0.187**	-0.166***
	(-2.41)	(-3.03)	(-3.88)
Female Inc., Neither Accepted Bribe	0.0558	0.0368	0.0467
	(0.71)	(0.42)	(0.80)
Female Inc., Incumbent Accepted Bribe	-0.157*	-0.225***	-0.192***
	(-2.44)	(-3.47)	(-4.20)
Female Inc., Challenger Accepted Bribe	0.261***	0.169*	0.215***
	(3.93)	(2.45)	(4.47)
Female Inc., Both Accepted Bribe	-0.0938	-0.143*	-0.118**
	(-1.57)	(-2.29)	(-2.74)
Chile	0.0150	-0.00159	0.00676
	(0.65)	(-0.07)	(0.43)
Uruguay	0.0633**	0.0311	0.0465**
	(2.68)	(1.43)	(2.89)
Constant	0.341***	0.371***	0.356***
	(5.79)	(6.04)	(8.38)
N	2130	2204	4334

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$