

**POL 242: Corruption**  
**Spring 2019 (Syllabus Version: 1/24/2019)**  
**121 Manchester Hall, T R 9:30a-10:45a**

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**COURSE OBJECTIVES AND LEARNING OUTCOMES**

This course seeks to help students ask and answer important questions about corruption, traditionally defined as the appropriation of public resources for private gain.

Students will be able to:

1. define corruption, understanding the tradeoffs implicit in different conceptualizations and measures;
2. consider why corruption is endemic in some countries while in others it is not by understanding, comparing, and critiquing theories proposed in the literature and the evidence offered to support these theories;
3. consider why some people choose to participate in corruption while others do not by understanding and critiquing evidence offered to support these various explanations;
4. consider the possible effects of corruption on political and economic outcomes in a country by understanding and critiquing evidence offered to support the existence of these possible effects; and
5. make written arguments in response to descriptive and analytical questions using information drawn from the class's readings.

**GRADING POLICIES AND ASSIGNMENT DETAILS**

**Grade Components:**

- Discussion Responses: 33%
- Midterm Exam: 33%
- Final Exam: 33%

**Grading Scale:**

100%-93%: A	76.9%-73%: C
92.9%-90%: A-	72.9%-70%: C-
89.9%-87%: B+	69.9%-67%: D+
86.9%-83%: B	66.9%-63%: D
82.9%-80%: B-	62.9%-60%: D-
79.9%-77%: C+	>59.5%: F

**Exams:** There will be two exams in this class, a midterm and a final. All exams are cumulative, but will focus on material learned since the last exam. Exams will be taken home, and you will be bound by the honor system when taking the exam. No class materials, references, or other students may be consulted during an exam.

**Discussion Responses:** Discussion questions will be distributed in advance of each day's readings. One of those questions will be selected at the beginning of each class and students will need to write 1-2 pages responding to that discussion question in the first ten minutes of class. (Most or all of the questions will form the basis for that day's discussion). You are permitted to use your notes to assist you with these response questions. The lowest eight grades on these responses will be dropped; the rest will be averaged to form this portion of the grade.

**Attendance:** Regular attendance is typically a prerequisite for success in the class, although no points are deducted on the basis of an absence alone. Anything taught in class is testable material, and not everything I teach in class will be in the course reading material.

## **COURSE POLICIES**

**Late Work:** Assignments are due at the date and time I specify for the assignment. Late exams will be marked off at 5 percentage points for the first hour late, and an additional 10 percentage points for every subsequent hour late. Discussion questions cannot be submitted late or made up.

Important note: Students are responsible for submitting working, uncorrupted files for all assignments. If a file is corrupted and needs to be re-sent, and re-sending happens after the assignment deadline, a late penalty will be assessed.

Exams may not be taken late. Failing to take the exam during the scheduled time window will result in no credit for the exam.

Penalties for late assignments may be re-scheduled under the following three circumstances:

- (1) a death in the immediate family (parent, spouse, sibling, or child) within two weeks before the assignment due date;
- (2) in the event of an unforeseeable medical emergency affecting you, your spouse, or your child; or
- (3) participation in a Wake Forest-sponsored academic or sporting event.

In the event of (1) or (3), you must give me **at least 24 hours advance notice and preferably more** (via e-mail or a phone call) that you will miss the exam, or it may not be made up. I may require supporting documentation. All penalty waivers are at the discretion of the instructor. Under these circumstances, I will extend your due date

and/or schedule you a make-up exam time. **Important note: conflicts with a work schedule, non-academic trip, or vacation are not a valid reason to miss an exam or any other assignment** and cannot be the basis for a penalty waiver.

**Honor Code/Academic Misconduct:** All forms of academic misconduct will be handled according to the Wake Forest University Honor Code. Details on the Honor Code are available at <https://studentconduct.wfu.edu/honor-system-wfu/>.

If you ever have any questions about what you should do to stay within the honor code on a particular assignment, **contact me with your question and I can assist you**. I cannot guarantee a timely response unless you contact me at least 24 hours in advance of the time the assignment is due.

**Students with Disabilities:** If you have a disability and require accommodation in this class, please contact me as soon as possible (within the first two weeks of class) to discuss these accommodations. You will also need to contact the Disability Services Office (telephone extension: 5929) in 118 Reynolda Hall. More information is available at <https://lac.wfu.edu/disability-services/>.

**Syllabus Change Policy:** All policies of this syllabus may be changed by Prof. Esarey with advance notice.

## **COURSE MATERIALS**

### **Required Textbooks:**

- Ray Fisman and Miriam A. Golden. 2017. *Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford University Press.

**Note:** All students must have a valid Wake Forest e-mail address and login (and access to the Sakai website) to participate in this course.

## COURSE OUTLINE AND ASSIGNED READINGS

Date	Topic	Readings
1/15	Introduction	N/A
1/17	Basic concepts and frameworks in corruption	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 1 (pp. 1-21)
1/22	The self-reinforcing nature of corruption	Corbacho et al. (2016). "Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 60(4): 1077-1092. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12244">https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12244</a>
1/24	Defining and classifying corruption	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 2 (pp. 23-54)
1/29	Measuring corruption	Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014). "What do Corruption Indices Measure?" <i>Economics and Politics</i> 26(2): 309-331. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12037">https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12037</a>
1/31	Where is corruption most prevalent?	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 3 (pp. 55-82)
2/5	Sociological and institutional causes of corruption in China	Dong and Torgler (2013). "Causes of corruption: Evidence from China." <i>China Economic Review</i> 26: 152-169. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.09.005">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.09.005</a>
2/7	Inequality and corruption	Jong-sun and Khagram (2005). "A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption." <i>American Sociological Review</i> 70(1): 136-157. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240507000107">https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240507000107</a>
2/12	Centralization and corruption	Fisman and Gatti (2002). "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries." <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> 83: 325-245. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00158-4">https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00158-4</a>
2/14	What are the consequences of corruption?	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 4 (pp. 83-119)
2/19	Corruption and happiness	Tavits (2008). "Representation, Corruption, and Subjective Well-Being." <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> 41(12): 1607-1630. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007308537">https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007308537</a>

2/21	Resource extraction and corruption	Knutsen et al. (2016). "Mining and Local Corruption in Africa." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 61(2): 320-334. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12268">https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12268</a>
2/26	Corruption and the environment	Cole (2007). "Corruption, income, and the environment: An empirical analysis." <i>Ecological Economics</i> 62(3-4): 637-647. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.08.003">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.08.003</a>
2/28	Corruption and trust in government: the case of Mexico	Morris and Klesner (2010). "Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from Mexico." <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> 43(10): 1258-1285. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010369072">https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010369072</a>
<b>Midterm Exam distributed 2/28</b>		
3/5	Who is involved in corruption, and why?	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 5 (pp. 121-150)
3/7	Gender and corruption	Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001). "Are women really the 'fairer' sex? Corruption and women in government." <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i> 46(4): 423-429. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00169-X">https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00169-X</a>
3/12	Spring Break	
3/14	Spring Break	
3/19	Patronage and voting	Sadanandan (2012). "Patronage and Decentralization: The Politics of Poverty in India." <i>Comparative Politics</i> 44(2): 211-228. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.5129/001041512798837996">https://doi.org/10.5129/001041512798837996</a>
3/21	What are the cultural bases of corruption?	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 6 (pp. 151-172)
3/26	How do political institutions affect corruption?	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 7 (pp. 173-201)
3/28	Gender and corruption II	Esarey and Chirillo (2013). "'Fairer sex' or purity myth? Corruption, gender, and institutional context." <i>Politics and Gender</i> 9(4): 361-389. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X13000378">https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X13000378</a>

4/2	Accountability and corruption: theory	Tavits and Schwindt-Bayer (2016). "A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption." Chapter 2 in <i>Corruption, Accountability, and Clarity of Responsibility</i> (pp. 17-32) [Available on Sakai]
4/4	Accountability and corruption: evidence	Tavits and Schwindt-Bayer (2016). "Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions." Chapter 4 in <i>Corruption, Accountability, and Clarity of Responsibility</i> (pp. 47-67) [Available on Sakai]
4/9	How do countries shift from high to low corruption?	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 8 (pp. 203-231)
4/11	Voting behavior and corruption	Klasnja et al. (2014). "Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting." <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> 46(1): 67-94. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000088">https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000088</a>
4/16	Patronage, bureaucratic corruption, and reform in the United States	Theriault (2004). "Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People." <i>Journal of Politics</i> 65(1): 50-68. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00003">https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00003</a>
4/18	What can be done to reduce corruption?	Fisman and Golden, Chapter 9 (pp. 233-264)
4/23	Effectiveness of civil servants vs. patronage appointees	Lewis (2007). "Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?" <i>Journal of Politics</i> 69(4): 1073-1088. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x</a>
4/25	The effect of foreign aid on corruption	Tavares (2003). "Does foreign aid corrupt?" <i>Economics Letters</i> 79(1): 99-106. URL: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00293-8">https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00293-8</a>